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Abstract
The present research examines the factors that affect how people think about the future. Chapter 1
examines how choice affects future time perception. Two experiments manipulated the presence of
choice regarding future experiences, and asked participants to indicate their subjective temporal distance
to the future experiences. Results showed that the future experiences felt closer when people had a
choice about them compared to when they did not have such a choice. Chapter 2 examines how valence
and culture affect the sequence preference for future experiences. The results from two studies showed
that people were more likely to prefer an ascending sequence for negative experiences than positive
experiences, and that people were more likely to prefer a descending sequence for positive experiences
than negative experiences. They also showed that Americans were more likely to prefer an ascending
sequence than Indians and that Indians were more likely to prefer a descending sequence than
Americans. Chapter 3 examines how culture affects temporal orientation. Building on prior research that
has compared the cultural differences on past, present, and future orientation, I hypothesize that East
Asians focus on the past and future more than North Americans, and North Americans focus on the
present more than East Asians. It is suggested that in addition to a cultural difference in the focus on the
three temporal domains, when moving from any past or future time point toward the present, North
Americans’ focus on the temporal domain grows more than East Asians’ focus. I present evidence in
three categories. Specially, I compare East Asians’ and North Americans’ focus on a temporal domain,
their mental representation of a temporal domain and their subjective temporal distance to a temporal
domain.
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ABSTRACT
WHAT AFFECTS PROSPECTION? – AN EXAMINATION OF THE FACTORS
THAT AFFECT FUTURE TIME PERCEPTION, SEQUENCE PREFERENCE FOR
FUTURE EXPERIENCE, OR FUTURE TEMPORAL ORIENTATION
Xuan Gao
Paul Rozin, Gal Zauberman
The present research examines the factors that affect how people think about the future.
Chapter 1 examines how choice affects future time perception. Two experiments
manipulated the presence of choice regarding future experiences, and asked participants
to indicate their subjective temporal distance to the future experiences. Results showed
that the future experiences felt closer when people had a choice about them compared to
when they did not have such a choice. Chapter 2 examines how valence and culture affect
the sequence preference for future experiences. The results from two studies showed that
people were more likely to prefer an ascending sequence for negative experiences than
positive experiences, and that people were more likely to prefer a descending sequence
for positive experiences than negative experiences. They also showed that Americans
were more likely to prefer an ascending sequence than Indians and that Indians were
more likely to prefer a descending sequence than Americans. Chapter 3 examines how
culture affects temporal orientation. Building on prior research that has compared the
cultural differences on past, present, and future orientation, I hypothesize that East Asians
focus on the past and future more than North Americans, and North Americans focus on
the present more than East Asians. It is suggested that in addition to a cultural difference
in the focus on the three temporal domains, when moving from any past or future time
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point toward the present, North Americans’ focus on the temporal domain grows more
than East Asians’ focus. I present evidence in three categories. Specially, I compare East
Asians’ and North Americans’ focus on a temporal domain, their mental representation of
a temporal domain and their subjective temporal distance to a temporal domain.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
How people think about the future (i.e., prospection, Gilbert & Wilson, 2007) has
important implications in perception, cognition, affect, memory, motivation, and action
(Seligman, Railton, Baumeister & Sripada, 2013). Prior research has noted the adaptive
functions of prospection, including making decisions (Bechara & Damasio, 2005;
Seligman et al., 2013), solving problems, planning actions (Bar, 2007, 2009; Bar,
Aminoff, Mason, & Fenske, 2007; Binder et al., 1999; Buckner & Vincent, 2007;
Gollwitzer, 1999; Seligman et al., 2013; Singer, 1966; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006),
developing creative solutions (for reviews, see Antrobus, Singer, Goldstein, & Fortgang,
1970; Gold & Cundiff, 1980; Klinger, 1999), and achieving goals (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin,
& Armor, 1998; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2010; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).
The present research examines the factors that affect prospection. We examine
prospection in three aspects: future time perception, preference for future experiences,
and future temporal orientation, and identify factors that contribute to each of them.
Future time perception has been shown to affect intertemporal preferences (Kim
& Zauberman, 2009; Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc & Bettman, 2009) and motivation
(Bashir, Wilson, Lockwood, Chasteen & Alisat, 2014). Prior research on the factors that
relate to the subjective temporal distance of future events has focused on the state of the
person, the nature of the experience or the framing of time intervals. For example, a
delayed monetary reward felt further away when people were sexually aroused (Kim &
Zauberman, 2013). A future gain felt further away compared to a future loss (Bilgin &
LeBoeuf, 2010). Future outcomes felt further away when the time interval was described
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by amounts of time rather than by dates (LeBoeuf, 2006). Chapter 1 examines how an
intervening event related to and preceding the future experience, more specifically, a
choice, affects the subjective temporal distance of the future. Two between-subject
studies manipulated the presence of choice and asked participants to indicate their
subjective temporal distance to the fictional future scenarios. A pilot study found a trend
that a future with a choice felt closer than a future without one with undergraduate
students. Experiment 1 tested a wider range of scenarios and valences on Mturkers, and
replicated the finding from the pilot study with significant results. Experiment 2
suggested that it was the presence or absence of choice rather than four other accounts
that caused such a difference. The perceived duration of the future experience was not
significantly different between the choice and the no choice conditions, and did not show
a consistent trend across studies.
Preference for future experiences. An experience can be time-framed as
anticipated, experienced, or remembered (Elster & Loewenstein, 1992; Kahneman,
1999). There may be a general human trend to emphasize one or the other of these
perspectives, and there may as well be individual and cultural differences. Preferring a
particular perspective may influence actual preferences or choices for future experiences
(e.g., Rozin & Rozin, 2017). For example, if memory were privileged, there would be a
tendency to seek novel experiences, because they are more likely to create new memories
(e.g., Rozin & Rozin, 2017). If anticipation were privileged, one would put off positive
events, but arrange to experience negative (or more negative) events sooner (Berns, et al.,
2006; Loewenstein, 1987). The anticipation privilege theory states that a privilege of
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anticipation may correspond to a preference for an ascending sequence for positive (bestlast) as well as negative (worst-first) experiences, thus maximizing positive anticipation
and minimizing negative anticipation (dread), respectively. Chapter 2 builds on a general
finding that most Americans prefer sequences that get better over time (see Frederick &
Lowenstein, 2008 for limitations). It differs from prior work in that 1) it employs more
short term every day experiences; 2) it directly compares sequences of positive events
and sequences of negative events in the same domain, and 3) it explores sequence
preference, for the first time, in a non-Western culture (India), in comparison to
Americans. The study examines how people prefer to order their everyday life
experiences in 7 domains in the future and specifically examines the effects of valence
and culture on the sequence preference. The results showed that people were more likely
to prefer an ascending sequence for negative experiences than positive experiences, and
that people were more likely to prefer a descending sequence for positive experiences
than negative experiences. The results also showed that Americans were more likely to
prefer an ascending sequence than Indians and that Indians were more likely to prefer a
descending sequence than Americans. For judgments of a whole life, both groups prefer a
pattern in which well being rises gradually, a preference that is more prominent for
Americans than Indians. We discussed each motivation to prefer an ascending or a
descending sequence noted in Frederick and Lowenstein (2008) in light of the valence
and cultural effects.
Future time orientation has been shown to correlate with conscientiousness,
consideration of future consequences, and predicts planning and achievement of future
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goals (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Chapter 3 examines how culture affects future temporal
orientation and specifically reviews the cultural difference between East Asian and North
American in terms of temporal orientation. Based on the cultural differences on holistic
versus analytical cognitive processing style, and cyclical versus linear prediction trends,
this review hypothesizes that East Asians focus on the past and future more than North
Americans, whereas North Americans focus on the present more than East Asians. This
review also proposes a speculation about how the cultural difference in temporal
orientation changes along the continuous temporal dimension of the past, present and
future.
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CHAPTER 1
Choice Brings the Future Closer to the Present
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Abstract
How does the presence or absence of choice for a future experience affect the perceived
temporal distance to the future experience? We predict that a future with a choice feels
closer than a future without one based mainly on construal level theory (Trope &
Liberman, 2010). Two experiments manipulated the presence of choice regarding
fictional future scenarios, and asked participants to indicate their subjective temporal
distance to the future scenarios. The results of experiment 1 supported the hypothesis.
Experiment 2 showed that it was the presence or absence of choice rather than four other
accounts that caused the difference in time perception. We also replicated prior findings
that positive future experiences felt further away compared to negative ones (Bilgin &
LeBoeuf, 2010), and found that the negative future experiences felt longer in duration
compared to positive ones.
Keywords: time perception, prospection, choice
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Choice Brings the Future Closer to the Present
Suppose your family is about to take a vacation. Have you agreed on a place to go
or do you need to choose among multiple destinations? Suppose you’re about to move
into a new apartment. Have you signed a lease already or do you need to choose among
multiple apartments? The contrast between a future scenario with one option (referred to
as a closed future) and a future scenario with a choice (referred to as an open future) is
common in everyday life. How does the presence or absence of a choice affect how
distant the future experience seems?
Future time perception has been shown to affect intertemporal preferences and
goal achievement. Subjective time perception may affect the discount rate in
intertemporal preferences (Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009). It is possible
that when people make decisions about the future, they use the subjective temporal
distance to guide their decisions. For example, if a future reward feels further away,
people may show a higher discount rate. People are more motivated to pursue long-term
goals when they perceive the goals as closer to the present (Bashir, Wilson, Lockwood,
Chasteen, & Alisat, 2014). For example, students who perceived the upcoming test to be
closer were more motivated to prepare for the test and practiced more for the test (Peetz,
Wilson, & Strahan, 2009).
Prior research on the factors that relate to the subjective temporal distance of
future events has focused on the state of the person, the nature of the experience or the
framing of time intervals. For example, a delayed monetary reward felt further away
when people were sexually aroused (Kim & Zauberman, 2013). A future gain felt further
away compared to a future loss (Bilgin & LeBoeuf, 2010). Future outcomes felt further
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away when the time interval was described by amounts of time rather than by dates
(LeBoeuf, 2006). The current research examines how an intervening event related to and
preceding the future experience, more specifically, a choice, affects the subjective
temporal distance of the future.
Why study the effect of choice on the subjective temporal distance aside from the
fact that the contrast of a future with a choice and a future without a choice is common in
everyday life? First, perception of the future is a major aspect of understanding humans
and their choices. Decision scientists (e.g., Peters, Kunreuther, Sagara, Slovic & Schley,
2012) have identified the general problem that people are disinclined to make future
choices that have only long term future benefits (such as buying life insurance). Any
reframing of these choices that makes them appear closer in time could promote more
adaptive decisions. Second, it may be possible to manipulate the presence or absence of
choice regarding future experiences with little extra cost or effort. If the relationship
between choice and subjective temporal distance is well understood, this may be an
efficient way to design future experiences to facilitate desirable outcomes. For example,
teachers can create a writing assignment with a choice of paper topics, or no such a
choice, alter the subjective temporal distance to the deadline, and ultimately affect how
motivated students work on the assignment and how much effort they put into the
assignment. A small change in designing the assignment can potentially improve
academic outcome, with little extra effort from the teachers. The retirement plan may
offer a choice of multiple saving plans or no such a choice, alter the subjective temporal
distance to the retirement, and affect how much people save prior to retirement.

13

We predict that an open future feels closer than a closed future for three reasons.
First, the construal level theory noted that people mentally simulate events at different
level of concreteness and abstraction levels (Trope & Liberman, 2010). When they think
about an event with greater details, the simulation is on a lower construal level. When
they think about an event in a more abstract way, the simulation is on a higher construal
level. The level of construal corresponds to, among other things, the subjective temporal
distance to the event. Specifically, when the event is simulated at a lower construal level,
the event feels closer. When people need to make a choice, they may think about the
future scenario in greater details and at a lower construal level, which makes the open
future seem closer (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Second, the need to make a choice may be
arousing, which makes an open future feel more arousing than the closed future. Because
more emotional scenarios seem closer (Bratfisch, Ekman, Lundberg, & Kruger, 1971;
Zauberman, Levav, Diehl, & Bhargave, 2010), the open future may seem closer. Third,
the need to make a choice for the open future may induce people to focus on the endpoint
of the time interval (i.e., future experience), and decrease their attention to the interval
duration between now and the future experience, which makes the open future seem
closer (Zakay & Block, 1996, 1997). We further predict that the duration of the future
experience (from the start to the end of the future experience) would not differ between
the open and closed future, because the effect of choice proposed above doesn’t apply to
the perceived duration of the future experience.
The competing hypothesis is that the closed future feels closer than the open
future, which also has support from the literature. First, because the closed future only
has one option and the open future has multiple options, the option in the closed future is
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more probable (indeed, certain) than each of the options in the open future. According to
construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), more probable events are processed at
a lower level of construal than less probable events. Thus, the option in the closed future
is processed at a lower level of construal than each of the options in the open future,
which may make the closed future feel closer than the open future (Trope & Liberman,
2010). Second, because the open future has multiple options whereas the closed future
has only one option, the open future may be harder to imagine and visualize, which may
make the open future feel further away compared to the closed future. Third, prior
research has shown that accessible intervening events related to the target event make the
target event feel more distant in the past (Zauberman, Jonathan, Kristin & Rajesh, 2010).
A choice is an intervening event related to the future experience, and the prior research
on the past suggests that the choice may make the future experience feel further away.
The visual judgment of distance also increases with intervening objects (Ross, & Plug,
2002).
Experiment 1 also tested the valence effect documented in the literature, that
positive future experiences felt further away compared to negative ones (Bilgin &
LeBoeuf, 2010). Prior literature examined how positive versus negative auditory stimuli
modulated time perception, and found that negative sounds were judged to be longer than
positive ones (Noulhiane, Mella, Samson, Ragot, & Pouthas, 2007; however, the
perceived duration of pictures was affected by an interaction of valence and arousal,
Angrilli, Cherubini, Pavese, & Manfredini, 1997; see Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007 for a
review of how emotions affect time perception). We did not find a direct test of the
valence effect on perceived duration on future experiences. Based on the results from
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auditory stimuli, we predict that the duration of the negative future experiences feels
longer compared to the positive experiences.
We conducted a pilot study and two experiments to test the hypothesis that an
open future with a choice among multiple options feels closer than a closed future
without a choice. The pilot study and Experiment 1 manipulated the presence of choice
and asked participants to indicate their subjective temporal distance to fictional future
scenarios. Experiment 2 examined each of five accounts that might explain the difference
between the open and closed future in the prior two studies.
Pilot
Method
238 undergraduate students (67.2% female; age M = 19.79, SD = 1.19) from the
University of Pennsylvania participated in a pilot study and passed all three check
questions. Participants were randomly assigned to either a choice condition where they
read four scenarios each with five options, or a no choice condition where they read four
scenarios each with only one option. The descriptions for the choice condition indicated
that the choices would be made sometime between now and the start of the experiences.
For example, the choice condition for the trip scenario read, “suppose you win a lottery
that rewards you with a free two-week trip. They offer five possible destinations, all of
which you happen to like. Suppose you will go on this trip and choose one out
of five destinations. The trip will start in a month. Please take some time to imagine
yourself in the scenario stated above. The ‘next’ button will appear in 20 seconds, but
feel free to take as much time as you need.” The no choice condition for the trip scenario
was the same except it offered one possible destination instead of five. We included four
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positive scenarios, which were taking a trip in 1 month, moving into a new apartment in 1
month, starting an internship in 3 months, and starting graduate school in 18 months
(valence rated as M = 21.15 - 36.90 on a -50 extremely negative to +50 extremely positive
scale). The descriptions of all scenarios in the pilot study, Experiment 1 and 2 are
included in the Appendix.
Participants were asked to read and imagine four fictional scenarios one at a time,
write down their mental simulations of the scenarios, and answer subjective temporal
distance questions. The primary measurement was (1) how long it felt from now to the
start of the future experience, on a very short to very long analog scale, with no numerical
markers (Figure 1). We also asked (2) how long it felt from now to the end of the future
experience, on a very short to very long scale, with no numerical markers; (3) how long
the whole duration of the future experience felt to them, on a 0 (very short) to 11 (very
long) scale1; and (4) how they felt about the future experience, on an extremely negative
to neutral to extremely positive scale, with no numerical markers. In addition, we asked
participants (5) how long it felt from now to one year from now; and (6) how long it felt
from now to two years ago, both on a very short to very long scale, with no numerical
markers, before and after the manipulation. The latter two measures were to test whether
manipulation had an effect on the decontextualized past or future. All measures except
for the duration measure were on a 0-100 scale.
Results
To make the scores from different scenarios comparable, we transformed the raw scores
to z scores for each scenario. Specifically, we took the mean across both conditions of a
particular scenario, calculated the standard deviation of this combined distribution, and

17

computed a z score for each participant. We then averaged each participant’s z scores
across scenarios. We ran independent sample t-tests between the choice and no choice
groups on the mean z scores of the subjective temporal distance variables. Table 1
presents the descriptive and t-test results by scenario for the pilot study. Figure 2
summarizes the results on the primary measurement from Pilot, Experiment 1 and 2.
Based on the measure of (1) the subjective temporal distance from now to the start
of the future experience (abbreviated as “nts”), the choice condition (M = -.07, SD = .68,
n = 124) felt closer than the no choice condition (M = .07, SD = .64, n = 114), t(236) = 1.61, p = .109, d = .21. Based on the measure of (2) the subjective temporal distance
between now and the end of the future experience (abbreviated as “nte”), the choice
condition (M = -.07, SD = .69, n = 123) felt closer than the no choice condition (M = .10,
SD = .67, n = 114), t(235) = -1.88, p = .062, d = .25. However, neither difference reached
a p = .05 significance level in the pilot study. As expected, the choice (M = .01, SD = .65,
n = 124) and no choice (M = -.03, SD = .65, n = 114) conditions did not show a
significant difference in terms of (3) the perceived duration of the future experience,
t(236) = .42, p = .678, d = -.06. There was a trend that the durations in the no choice
condition were perceived to be shorter compared to the durations in the choice condition.
For each of the two subjective temporal distance questions that were NOT
specific to a scenario, how long it felt from now to one year from now, and how long it
felt from now to two years ago, we computed a difference score (after manipulation –
before manipulation) to represent the change of the subjective temporal distance between
now and the decontextualized past or future due to the manipulation. Independent t-tests
showed that the manipulation did not cause a significant change between the choice (M =
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6.82, SD = 20.42, n = 117) and no choice (M = 5.31, SD = 25.11, n = 109) conditions in
the subjective temporal distance of (5) the decontextualized future, t(224) = .50, p = .620,
d = -.07. There was no significant difference between the choice (M = .15, SD = 24.57, n
= 120) and no choice (M = -2.82, SD = 27.59, n = 110) conditions for (6) the
decontextualized past either, t(228) = .86, p = .389, d = -.11.
Discussion
We found a trend that people felt closer to open futures (with choices) than closed
futures (without choices), though the mean differences were NOT significant. The two
scenarios whose “nte” difference between the choice and the no choice conditions was
nominally significant were the two scenarios with the longest time intervals (the
apartment and graduate school scenarios, p = .04). We speculated that, if the objective
temporal distance between now and the future experience increased, there would be more
room for the two conditions to differ and the mean difference between the choice and no
choice conditions would increase. In Experiment 1, we increased the objective temporal
distance.
Experiment 1
Method
483 Mturk workers (54.5% female, age M = 37.49, SD = 11.78) completed the survey
and passed all three check questions. All participants were located in the United States,
older than 18 years old and native speakers of English. Participants were randomly
assigned to a choice condition or a no choice condition. The descriptions for the choice
condition indicated that the choices would be made sometime between now and the start
of the experiences. We included eight scenarios: a job promotion in 18 months, attending
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a court hearing with a high chance of winning the lawsuit in 48 months, taking a trip in
24 months, an anniversary meal in 12 months, a job demotion in 18 months, attending a
court hearing with a high chance of losing the lawsuit in 48 months, taking a medical
exam in 60 months, and moving into a cheaper apartment in 14 months. The scenarios
represented a wider range of feeling towards the future experiences compared to the pilot
study (valence rated as M = -34.89 to +39.49 on a -50 extremely negative - 50 extremely
positive scale).
We wanted to test the valence effect on the subjective temporal distance, and
therefore included the two job scenarios and the two lawsuit scenarios that were the same
except for valence. The display order of the positive and negative scenarios was
counterbalanced. Half of the participants responded to the positive version of the job and
lawsuit scenarios first (and responded to all scenarios in the following order: job
promotion, court hearing with a high chance of winning the lawsuit, trip, anniversary
meal, job demotion, court hearing with a high chance of losing the lawsuit, medical
exam, moving into a cheaper apartment), and the other half responded to the negative
version of the job and lawsuit scenarios first (and responded to all scenarios in the
following order: job demotion, court hearing with a high chance of losing the lawsuit,
medical exam, moving into a cheaper apartment, job promotion, court hearing with a high
chance of winning the lawsuit, trip, anniversary meal). Participants were asked to read the
eight fictional future experiences one at a time, imagine themselves in such scenarios,
and answer the subjective temporal distance questions: (1) how long it felt from now to
the start of the future experience; (2) how long it felt from now to the end of the future
experience; (3) how the whole duration of future experience felt to them; and (4) how
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they felt about the future experience. We asked participants (1) how long it felt from now
to one year from now, and (2) how long it felt from now to two years ago, before and
after the manipulation.
Results
As in the pilot study, we transformed the raw scores to z scores for each scenario and
used the mean z scores across scenarios as dependent variables. We conducted
independent sample t-tests between the choice and no choice groups on the mean z scores
of the subjective temporal distance variables. Table 2 presents the descriptive and t-test
results by scenario for Experiment 1.
Based on the measure of (1) the subjective temporal distance between now to the
start of the future experience (“nts”), the choice condition (M = -.11, SD = .64, n = 243)
felt closer than the no choice condition (M = .11, SD = .59, n = 240), t(481) = -3.96, p <
.001, d = .36. Based on the measure of (2) the subjective temporal distance between now
to the end of the future experience (“nte”), the choice condition (M = -.07, SD = .66, n =
243) felt closer than the no choice condition (M = .07, SD = .60, n = 240), t(481) = -2.58,
p = .01, d = .22. As predicted, the choice (M = -.02, SD = .57, n = 243) and no choice (M
= .02, SD = .54, n = 240) conditions were not significantly different in terms of (3) the
perceived duration of the future experience, t(481) = -.78, p = .436, d = .07. There was a
trend that the durations in the choice condition were perceived to be shorter compared to
the durations in the no choice condition.
As in the pilot study, we computed a difference score (after manipulation – before
manipulation) to represent the change of the subjective temporal distance between now
and the decontextualized past or future due to the manipulation. Independent sample t-
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tests showed that the manipulation did not cause a significant change between the choice
(M = -1.98, SD = 18.82, n = 242) and the no choice (M = .42, SD = 22.32, n = 240)
conditions in the subjective temporal distance of (5) the decontextualized future, t(480) =
-1.27, p = .203, d = .12. There was no significant difference between the choice (M = 2.74, SD = 20.72, n = 240) and no choice (M = -4.75, SD = 22.92, n = 237) conditions for
(6) the decontextualized past either, t(475) = 1.00, p = .317, d = -.09.
The positive and negative versions of the job and the lawsuit scenarios were the
same except for valence. To test whether there was a valence effect on the subjective
temporal distance, we conducted paired sample t-tests between the positive and negative
versions of the job and lawsuit scenarios2. Based on the measure of (1) the subjective
temporal distance between now to the start of the future experience (“nts”), the job
demotion (M = 58.60, SD = 28.89, n = 483) felt closer than the job promotion (M =
65.24, SD = 24.93, n = 483), t(482) = 4.95, p < .001, d = -.233, and the court hearing with
a high chance of losing (M = 76.16, SD = 27.42, n = 482) felt closer than the court
hearing with a high chance of winning (M = 81.60, SD = 21.70, n = 482), t(481) = 4.02, p
< .001, d = -.19. Based on the measure of (2) the subjective temporal distance between
now to the end of the future experience (“nte”), the job demotion (M = 66.95, SD =
28.87, n = 480) felt closer (but not significantly) than the job promotion (M = 69.36, SD =
25.58, n = 480), t(479) = 1.75, p = .081, d = -.08, and the court hearing with a high
chance of losing (M = 76.59, SD = 26.45, n = 481) felt closer than for the court hearing
with a high chance of winning (M = 80.15, SD = 23.06, n = 481), t(480) = 2.73, p = .007,
d = -.12. (3) The duration of the job demotion (M = 7.72, SD = 2.77, n = 481) felt longer
compared to the job promotion (M = 7.11, SD = 2.65, n = 481), t(480) = -4.75, p < .001, d
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= .22. The duration of the court hearing with a high chance of losing felt longer (M =
6.82, SD = 3.56, n = 482) compared to the court hearing with a high chance of winning
(M = 5.34, SD = 3.56, n = 482), t(481) = -8.99, p < .001, d = .41.
Discussion
Experiment 1 replicated and solidified the results from the pilot study, showing that an
open future (with a choice) felt closer than a closed future (with no choice). In addition,
the positive future experiences felt further away compared to the negative ones, but the
negative future experiences felt longer in duration compared to the positive ones. The
closed futures with no choice felt further away compared to the open futures with a
choice, but the duration of the two future experiences did not show a significant
difference. This suggests that the perception of “nts” and the duration of the future
experience may not work in the same direction.
Objectively, the temporal distance between now and the end of the future
experience consists of (1) the distance between now and the start of the experience and
(2) the duration of the experience. Thus, “nts” may be a better measure than “nte”,
because the “nts” is not related to the duration of the experience whereas “nte” is.
In fact, the measure of “nte” showed less consistent results compared to “nts”. For
example, the only two results with a “wrong” direction were based on the “nte” measure
(the two trip scenarios in the pilot study and Experiment 1 where the no choice condition
was perceived to be closer than the choice condition). In Experiment 2, we used the
results of “nts” as a measure of the subjective temporal distance between now and the
future experience, and dropped the measure of “nte”.
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Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that an open future with a choice felt closer compared to a
closed future with no choice. We designed Experiment 2 to rule out alternative accounts
of this basic effect (between the choice and the no choice conditions). The choice and no
choice conditions in the pilot and Experiment 1 were different in five aspects.
1. The choice condition required a choice, whereas the no choice condition did
not require a choice. (The difference we intentionally manipulated, and the focus of our
analysis)
2. The choice condition had the future experience determined sometime between
now and the start of the future experience, and the no choice condition had the future
experience already determined, because there was only one option.
3. Because one can only know about the future experience (e.g., where to go for
the trip) after it has been determined, the two conditions differed in terms of the time to
know about the future experience.
The number of options was different between the two conditions. There was only
one option in the no choice condition, which indicated both no uncertainty, and a lower
level of uncertainty. Therefore the two conditions were different in terms of:
4. The presence or absence of uncertainty, and
5. A lower or higher non-zero level of uncertainty.
In total, the two conditions were different in these five aspects, and we did not
know which was the cause of the difference in time perception. In Experiment 2, we
isolated each one of these five factors and tested their effects. For each factor, we created
two conditions that were the same except for the factor to be tested. An overview of the
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five factors and a description of the six conditions in Experiment 2 are presented in Table
3.
In order to test the choice factor, we created two conditions that were the same
except for the choice dimension (Condition 1 and 2). The future experience in Condition
1 was determined by a choice, and in Condition 2 it was determined by a random factor.
In both conditions, the time to determine the future experience AND the time to know the
future experience were around the start of the experience, and the number of options were
five.
To test whether the time to determine the future experience explained the finding,
we created two conditions in Experiment 2 that were the same except that the future
experience would be determined around the start of the experience in Condition 2 and the
future experience was already determined by now in Condition 3. In both conditions, the
future experience was to be determined by a random factor, the time to know the future
experience was around the start of the experience, and the number of options was five.
To test whether the time to know the future experience explained the finding, we
created two conditions in Experiment 2 that were the same except that the future
experience would become known around the start of the experience in Condition 3 and
the future experience was already known by now in Condition 4. In both conditions, the
future experience was to be determined by a random factor, the future experience was
already determined, and the number of options was five.
To test whether the presence of uncertainty explained the finding, we created two
conditions that were the same except that one had five options (Condition 4) and the other
had one option (Condition 6). In both conditions, the future experience was to be
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determined by a random factor, and the future experience was already determined and
known.
If we only tested the presence of uncertainty with two conditions that contrasted
five options versus one option, we would not be able to tell if the difference between the
two conditions, if any, was due to the presence of uncertainty, or a lower or higher nonzero level of uncertainty. To test whether a lower or higher non-zero level of uncertainty
explained the finding, we created two conditions in Experiment 2 that were the same
except that one had five options (Condition 2) and the other had two options (Condition
5). These two conditions differed only in terms of a lower or higher non-zero level of
uncertainty, but in both conditions where was a presence of uncertainty. In both
conditions, the future experience was to be determined by a random factor, the future
experience was to be determined and become known around the start of the experience.
Condition 1 largely corresponded to the choice condition in previous studies, with
some of the factors described more specifically. For example, the time to determine the
future experience was specified to be around the start of the experience in Experiment 2.
Condition 6 largely corresponded to the no choice condition in previous studies.
Condition 1 and 6 also worked as a replication for the basic effect.
For each factor, we tested if there was a significant difference between the two
conditions designed to test this factor. If so, then this factor was a potential cause of the
basic effect. If not, then this factor was unlikely to be the cause of the basic effect.
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Method
1317 participants (53.7% female) from Mturk completed the survey and passed all five
check questions. All participants were located in the United States, older than 18 years
old and native speakers of English (age M = 36.04, SD = 11.63).
Experiment 2 followed a six condition between-subject design. To test each of the
five factors, we created two conditions that were the same except for the factor to be
tested. The first section in Table 3 indicates which two conditions were compared to test
each factor, and the second section describes the factors in each condition. Experiment 2
included four fictional future scenarios: a job demotion in 18 months, being a defendant
in a lawsuit in 14 months, moving into a cheaper apartment in 24 months, and starting a
physical therapy program in 16 months. The scenarios represented a feeling towards the
future experiences ranging from M = -28.75 to 11.58 on a -50 extremely negative to 50
extremely positive scale.
Participants were randomly assigned to one out of the six conditions. They were
asked to read four fictional future experiences one at a time, imagine themselves in such
scenarios, and answer the subjective temporal distance questions: (1) how long it felt
from now to the start of the future experience; (2) how long the whole duration of future
experience felt to them; and (3) how they felt about the future experience. As in the
previous two studies, we asked participants to indicate (1) how long it felt from now to
one year from now and (2) how long it felt from now to two years ago, before and after
the manipulation.
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Results and discussion
As in the previous two studies, for each measure of the subjective temporal distance, we
transformed the raw scores to z scores for each scenario and averaged each participant’s z
scores across scenarios. We ran one-way ANOVAs with condition as a factor, and the
mean z scores as dependent variables, and when the ANOVA was significant, conducted
Tukey HSD for post hoc comparisons. Table 4 presents the descriptive results by scenario
for Experiment 2.
Based on the measure of (1) the subjective temporal distance between now and
the start of the future experience (“nts”), the six conditions were significantly different,
F(5, 1316) = 6.17, p < .001, η2 = 2.3%. The results replicated the findings from the
previous two studies. The future experience with a choice (Condition 1; M = -.23, SD =
.75, n = 222) felt closer than the future experience with no choice (Condition 6; M = .04,
SD = .74, n = 219), p = .001, d = .36. The future experience determined by a choice
(Condition 1; M = -.23, SD = .75, n = 222) felt closer than the future experience
determined by a random factor (Condition 2; M = .00, SD = .67, n = 220), p = .007, d =
.32.
The time to determine the future experience did not affect the subjective temporal
distance. There was no significant difference between Condition 2 where the future
experiences were determined around the start of the experience (M = .00, SD = .67, n =
220) and Condition 3 where the experiences were determined by now (M = .10, SD = .66,
n = 223), p = .690, d = .15. The time to know the future experience did not affect the
subjective temporal distance. There was no significant difference between Condition 3
where the time to know the experience was around the start of the experience (M = .10,
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SD = .66, n = 223) and Condition 4 where the experience was already known (M = .03,
SD = .68, n = 217), p = .893, d = -.10. The presence of uncertainty did not affect the
subjective temporal distance. There was no significant difference between Condition 4
with five options (M = .03, SD = .68, n = 217) and Condition 6 with one option (M = .04,
SD = .74, n = 219), p = 1.000, d = .01. A lower or a higher non-zero level of uncertainty
did not affect the subjective temporal distance. There was no significant difference
between Condition 2 with five options (M = .00, SD = .67, n = 220) and Condition 5 with
two options (M = .06, SD = .67, n = 216), p = .961, d = .09.
As expected, there was no significant difference between the six conditions in (2)
the perceived duration of the experience, F(5, 1315) = .86, p = .506, η2 = .33%. As in the
previous two studies, we computed a difference score (after manipulation – before
manipulation) to represent the change of subjective temporal distance between now to the
decontextualized past or future due to the manipulation. One-way ANOVAs showed that
the manipulation did not cause a significant change in the subjective temporal distance
(4) in the decontextualized future, F(5, 1310) = .459, p = .807, η2 = .18% or (5) the
decontextualized past, F(5, 1308) = .525, p = .758, η2 = .20%.
Experiment 2 replicated the findings from Experiment 1, that an open future with
a choice was perceived to be closer than a closed future without a choice. Experiment 2
further suggested that the presence of a choice was likely to explain the basic effect; and
that the four other accounts (the time to determine the experience, the time to know the
experience, the presence of uncertainty, and a lower or a higher non-zero level of
uncertainty) were unlikely to explain the basic effect.

29

General Discussion
A future with a choice was perceived to be closer than a future without one. Three
between-subject studies manipulated the presence of choice and asked participants to
indicate their subjective temporal distance to the fictional future scenarios. The pilot
study found a trend that a future with a choice felt closer than a future without one with
undergraduate students. The results suggested that this effect would be stronger in longer
time frames. Experiment 1 tested a wider range of scenarios and valences on Mturkers,
and replicated the finding from the pilot study with significant results. Experiment 2
suggested that it was the presence or absence of choice rather than four other accounts
that caused such a difference in time perception. The perceived duration of the future
experience was not significantly different between the choice and the no choice
conditions, and did not show a consistent trend across studies.
Prior research showed that, when there was an intervening event related to the
target event in the past, the target event felt more distant compared to no such intervening
event (Zauberman et al., 2010). The prior research did not specifically test intervening
events there were choices about the target events in the past. The current research showed
that, when the intervening event was a behavior related to a future scenario (i.e., a
choice), the future scenario felt closer compared to no such intervening event. When the
intervening event was related to a future scenario but required no action (i.e., a random
factor determines the future experience), the future scenario felt no different compared to
no such intervening event (compare Condition 4 and 6 in Experiment 2).
All three of the findings reported in this study examine cases where (1) a target
event occurs at time T; (2) there is an intervening event between now and the later time
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point T, and (3) the intervening event is related to the target event. The findings share an
independent variable, which is the presence or absence of the intervening event, and a
dependent variable, which is the subjective temporal distance between now and the target
event. However, the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable are
different, depending on the nature of the intervening event (e.g., choice or random
outcome) or the temporal context in reference to the studies just cited (past or future).
There may be some generalities. For example, the findings may be consistent with a
notion that the more attention the interval duration gets, the longer the time interval
seems (Zakay & Block, 1996, 1997). It is possible that the choice induces people to pay
more attention to the endpoint of the time interval (i.e., future experience) and thus less
attention to the interval duration whereas the intervening event of the past induces people
to pay attention to the interval duration. The effect of the random outcome on attention to
interval duration is somewhere in between. The findings are also consistent with a
speculation that the more control the person has over the target event, the closer the target
event seems. The person has the most control in the choice condition, less control in the
random outcome condition, and the least control over the target event that has already
occurred in the past. In fact, people may pay more attention to the target event that they
have more control over, and thus less attention to the interval duration of such events,
which makes such events seem closer. Future research may be able to examine these
issues and provide a more systematic and comprehensive view of the relationship
between intervening events and the subjective temporal distance.
The present research only investigated the effect of a choice regarding the future
experience on future time perception, e.g., a choice regarding where to go for a trip.
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Future research could investigate how other types of choices affect future time
perception, through which to clarify the nature of the choice that affects future time
perception. Specifically, future research can test the effect of a choice that is relevant to
the future experience but is NOT about the future experience itself; for example, a choice
about which luggage to purchase for a trip. Such a choice is related to the trip, but not
about the trip itself (e.g., where to go for a trip). Future research can also test the effect of
a choice that is irrelevant to the future experience; for example, a choice about which
college to go to before the start of a trip. If we interject such choices between now and
the start of the future experience, how do they affect the subjective temporal distance
between now and the start of the future experience?
The contrast between the positive and negative versions of the job or lawsuit
scenario replicated prior findings that positive future experiences felt further away
compared to negative ones (Bilgin & LeBoeuf, 2010). In addition, we found that the
negative future experiences felt longer in duration compared to positive ones.
The valence manipulation had different effects on the measures including the
present time point (“nts”/“nte”) and measures excluding the present time point
(“duration”), so did the choice manipulation. While the “nts” or “nte” measures showed a
significant difference between the choice and no choice conditions, the duration of the
future experience did not. The results allude to a more general question, how does the
special temporal point of the present affect the perception of time?
It has been noted that a negative experience was perceived to be more intense than
a positive experience (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin &
Royzman, 2001). That is, the positive and negative experiences were different in term of
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intensity levels as well as valence. Bilgin and LeBoeuf (2010) have noted that both the
valence effect and the intensity effect may be at work to contribute to the difference in
time perception between positive and negative events. The present research only tested
the valence effect and did not specifically test the effect of intensity. The job scenario’s
positive version (M = 31.80) was rated as more intense than the negative version (M = 16.96), and the lawsuit scenario’s negative version (M = -34.89) was rated as more
intense than the positive version (M = 10.90). Both pairs of scenarios showed the same
effect that the positive future experiences felt further away than the negative ones, and
that the negative future experiences felt longer in duration than the positive ones. The
results suggest that the difference between the positive and negative in Experiment 1 was
due to a valence effect, rather than an intensity effect.
The finding that the presence of choice makes the contextualized future feel closer
has practical implications. First, we may alter the presence or absence of choice to affect
the subjective temporal distance to the future, and facilitate desirable outcomes. For
example, with a choice of retirement savings plans, people may feel closer to their
retirement, discount the future less, and save more. With a choice of paper topics,
students may feel closer to the deadline and work harder for the assignment. Such simple
alterations of the future experience (by offering a choice or no choice) can potentially
lead to important desirable outcomes. However, the presence of choice doesn’t make the
decontextualized future feel closer. A choice of retirement savings plans wouldn’t make
the next year feel closer to the present. This may suggest that the presence of choice only
changes temporal perception in the domain of the choice. For example, a choice of
retirement savings plans wouldn’t make people pay attention to their health condition.
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Such questions warrant future research. We could examine (as suggested above) what
defines the “domain” of the choice or decision.
Second, the presence of absence of perceived choice may be malleable, which
provides an opportunity for intervention. The presence of choice is a matter of perception
as much as it is a reality. Factors such as cognitive style, personality, sociocultural
systems and mental status may affect the perceived presence of choice. For example,
divergent thinking (Guilford, 1956) or openness to experiences (McCrae & John, 1992)
may promote the perception of multiple options. Americans are more likely than Indians
to construe actions as choices (Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010).
Rumination prompts dysphoric individuals to appraise their problems as unsolvable and
fail to come up with effective solutions (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky,
2008). This suggests that rumination may relate to a perception of fewer choices. It is
very likely that the perceived presence of choice makes the contextualized future feel
closer, just as the real presence of choice does. For example, the perceived presence of
choice related to divergent thinking and openness to experiences may make the
contextualized future feel closer, and the perceived absence of choice related to
rumination may make a contextualized future feel more distant. A training program
designed to enable the individual to detect and perceive more choices may make the
future feel closer and lead to desirable outcomes. For example, teachers may routinely
encourage students to actively think about different options and ultimately help students
to develop the cognitive habit to do so in a given situation.
Third, the present research suggests a possible way for inborn advantage, choice,
subjective temporal distance, motivation and effort, and acquired advantage to complete a
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cycle of reinforcement. For example, people with an advantage of cognitive flexibility
may perceive more choices, which make them feel closer to and work harder for the
longer-term goals, and their longer-term achievements may reinforce their cognitive
ability. People with a higher level of socioeconomic status (SES) may perceive or indeed
have more choices, which make them feel closer to and work harder for the longer-term
goals, which in turn place them even higher on the socioeconomic ladder. This cycle of
reinforcement may enlarge the gap between people born with a lower or higher level of
cognitive flexibility or SES. Such linkages warrant future research. If such linkages do
exist, it may be possible to intervene by introducing more choices or training programs to
increase the perceived number of choices in a given situation for people with lower SES,
make people feel closer to their futures and become more motivated to work towards long
term goals.

35

Footnotes
1. We aimed to prompt the participants to respond to the subjective temporal distance
questions based on gut feeling rather than calculation. We used a different scale for the
duration question than the other subjective temporal distance questions. This made it
harder for participants to “calculate” the duration of the experience by taking the
difference between the subjective temporal distance of the end (“nte”) AND the start of
the experience (“nts”).
2. We used raw scores for the paired sample t-tests because the tests couldn’t be based on
z scores. The raw scores couldn’t be averaged across scenarios because the job and
lawsuit scenarios had different objective temporal distances. Therefore we presented the
t-test results for the job and lawsuit scenarios separately.
3. The Cohen’s d of the valence differences was computed with the adjustment of the
correlation between the paired samples.
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Appendix
Scenario descriptions for the pilot study, and Experiment 1 and 2
Pilot study
Choice condition
1. Suppose you win a lottery that rewards you with a free two-week trip. They offer five
possible destinations, all of which you happen to like. Suppose you will go on this trip
and choose one out of the five destinations. The trip will start in a month.
2. Suppose you are considering renting a new apartment for a yearlong lease. You have
found five apartments that meet your criteria. Suppose you will choose one to lease and
move into your new home in one month.
3. Suppose you are offered a 10-week internship position from five different companies.
You like each of these positions. Suppose you will accept one of the five offers and start
working as an intern in three months.
4. Suppose you’ve been accepted by five two-year graduate degree programs and you
like all of them. Suppose you will accept one of the five offers and start the program in 1
year and a half.
No choice condition
1. Suppose you win a lottery that rewards you with a free two-week trip to a destination
that you happen to like. Suppose you will go on this trip, which will start in a month.
2. Suppose you are considering renting a new apartment for a yearlong lease. You have
found one apartment that meets your criteria. Suppose you will rent this apartment and
move into your new home in one month.
3. Suppose you are offered a 10-week internship position in a company that you like.
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Suppose you will accept the position and start working as an intern in three months.
4. Suppose you’ve been accepted by one two-year graduate program that you like.
Suppose you will accept the offer and start the program in 1 year and a half.
Experiment 1
Choice condition
1. Suppose you are offered a job promotion, which involves a 3-year renewed job
contract and the opportunity to transfer to one of five departments that you’ve been
wanting to join. Suppose you will choose one department and start working in the new
department in 18 months.
2. Suppose you’re involved in a small lawsuit that you are very likely to win. The lawyer
offers five approaches to proceed with the case, and you need to choose one out of the
five. You need to go to the court in 4 years. The court hearing will take 4 hours.
3. Suppose you’re planning your dream vacation. It will be a two-month trip. You’ve
narrowed down to five destinations that you really like and will choose one of them.
Because you have a busy schedule and some of the places on your itinerary have a long
waitlist, the earliest date to go on this vacation is in 2 years.
4. Suppose you decide to make a reservation at a restaurant that requires a long wait to
celebrate an anniversary next year (in 12 months). You narrowed down to five restaurants
that you like and will choose one of them. The prix fixe meals usually consist of nine
courses and last for four hours.
5. Suppose your department gets eliminated and you job position no longer exists. The
company offers you a 3-year renewed job contract and the opportunity to transfer to one
of five departments. This will be a step down for you, and you don’t find this new
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arrangement particularly desirable. However, you decide to choose one department to
join and start working in the new department in 18 months.
6. Suppose you’re involved in a small lawsuit that you are very likely to lose. The lawyer
offers five approaches to proceed with the case, and you need to choose one out of the
five. You need to go to the court in 4 years. The court hearing will take 4 hours.
7. Suppose you need to get a routine medical exam in 5 years. The exam will be painful
but not harmful, and last for 2 hours. You can choose to get the exam from five different
hospitals. Suppose you will choose one hospital and get the exam.
8. Suppose you lost your job recently and had to 3ind a cheaper place to live. You’ve
searched apartment listings and found 3ive apartments within your budget. Suppose you
will choose one apartment to lease and move into your new home in 14 months. The
lease lasts for 2 years.
No choice condition
1. Suppose you are offered a job promotion, which involves a 3-year renewed job
contract and the opportunity to transfer to a department that you’ve been wanting to join.
Suppose you will start working in the new department in 18 months.
2. Suppose you’re involved in a small lawsuit that you are very likely to win. The lawyer
offers one approach to proceed with the case. You need to go to the court in 4 years. The
court hearing will take 4 hours.
3. Suppose you’re planning your dream vacation to a destination that you really like. It
will be a two-month trip. Because you have a busy schedule and some of the places on
your itinerary have a long waitlist, the earliest date to go on this vacation is in 2 years.
4. Suppose you decide to make a reservation at a restaurant that you like to celebrate an
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anniversary next year (in 12 months) as it requires a long wait. The prix fixe meals
usually consist of nine courses and last for four hours.
5. Suppose your department gets eliminated and you job position no longer exists. The
company offers you a 3-year renewed job contract and the opportunity to transfer to
another department. This will be a step down for you, and you don’t find this new
arrangement particularly desirable. However, you decide to join the new department and
start working in 18 months.
6. Suppose you’re involved in a small lawsuit that you are very likely to lose. The lawyer
offers one approach to proceed with the case. You need to go to the court in 4 years. The
court hearing will take 4 hours.
7. Suppose you need to get a routine medical exam in one hospital in 5 years. The exam
will be painful but not harmful, and last for 2 hours.
8. Suppose you lost your job recently and had to find a cheaper place to live. You have
found one apartment that meets your criteria. Suppose you will lease this apartment and
move into your new home in 14 months. The lease lasts for 2 years.
Experiment 2
Condition 1
1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a
5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18
months. Currently the company has a position at your level in five departments, all of
which will be a step down for you. In 18 months, you have to decide which of the five
departments to join and start working in the new department.
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take
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a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought
of five different strategies for your defense. It’s up to you to choose which one strategy to
use. You need to decide one month before the first hearing in 14 months.
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have
been searching apartment listings and have found five apartment buildings that offer
affordable housing. You will decide which one of the five to rent one month before the
move and move into your new home in 16 months. The lease lasts for 2 years.
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your
doctor recommends five physical therapy programs that you can join. In 2 years, you will
decide which one to join and start the physical therapy.
Condition 2
1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a
5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18
months. Currently the company has a position at your level in five departments, all of
which will be a step down for you. The company will transfer you to the department that
happens to have a vacancy in 18 months. The result is out of your control. You will know
about which department to join and start working in the new department in 18 months.
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take
a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought
of five different strategies for your defense. The evidence that the lawyer ends up getting
determines the best strategy to use. You will know which strategy to use one month
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before the first hearing in 14 months.
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have
been searching apartment listings and have found five apartment buildings that offer
affordable housing. You’re on the waitlist for all five. You plan to move into the one that
happens to have a vacancy in 16 months. You will know which apartment building has a
vacancy one month before the move and move into your new home in 16 months. The
lease lasts for 2 years.
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your
doctor recommends five physical therapy programs that you can join. You are on the
waitlist for all five. You will join the one that happens to have a spot available in 2 years,
at which time you will know which program to join and start the physical therapy.
Condition 3
1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a
5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18
months. Currently the company has a position at your level in five departments, all of
which will be a step down for you. The company will transfer you to the department that
happens to have a vacancy in 18 months. The result is out of your control. The company
already knows which employee will leave in 18 months at the end of the contract, and the
department you will join, but it’s their policy to not inform you until 18 months later, at
the time you will start working in the new department.
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take
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a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought
of five different strategies for your defense. The evidence that the lawyer ends up getting
determines the best strategy to use. Which piece of evidence still exists and is available to
the lawyer is a certainty at this point, but you won’t know until the lawyer conducts a
thorough search for the evidence. You will know which strategy to use one month before
the first hearing in 14 months.
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have
been searching apartment listings and have found five apartment buildings that offer
affordable housing. You’re on the waitlist for all five. You plan to move into the one that
happens to have a vacancy in 16 months. The leasing office already knows which
building will have a vacancy in 16 months, but it’s their policy to not inform people until
one month before the move. You will move into the new home in 16 months. The lease
lasts for 2 years.
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your
doctor recommends five physical therapy programs that you can join. You are on the
waitlist for all five. The program coordinator already knows which program will have a
spot available in 2 years, but it’s their policy to not inform you until 2 years later, when
you start the physical therapy.
Condition 4
1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a
5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18
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months. Currently the company has a position at your level in five departments, all of
which will be a step down for you. One of the departments happens to have a vacancy in
18 months. The company just decided and told you that you will be transferred to this
department and start working in the new department in 18 months.
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take
a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought
of five different strategies for your defense. The evidence that the lawyer ends up getting
determines the best strategy to use. Just now the lawyer has finished the search for
evidence and thus determined which strategy to use.
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have
been searching apartment listings and have found five apartment buildings that offer
affordable housing. You’re on the waitlist for all five. Just now the real estate agent told
you which one of the buildings would have a vacancy in 16 months. You plan to move
into this apartment building in 16 months. The lease lasts for 2 years.
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your
doctor recommends five physical therapy programs that you can join. You are on the
waitlist for all five. The program coordinator just told you which one program would
have a spot available in 2 years and that would be the program for you to join. You will
start the physical therapy in 2 years.
Condition 5
1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a
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5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18
months. Currently the company has a position at your level in two departments, both of
which will be a step down for you. The company will transfer you to the department that
happens to have a vacancy in 18 months. The result is out of your control. You will know
about which department to join and start working in the new department in 18 months.
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take
a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought
of two different strategies for your defense. The evidence that the lawyer ends up getting
determines the best strategy to use. You will know which strategy to use one month
before the first hearing in 14 months.
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have
been searching apartment listings and have found two apartment buildings that offer
affordable housing. You’re on the waitlist for both. You plan to move into the one that
happens to have a vacancy in 16 months. You will know about which apartment building
has a vacancy one month before the move and move into your new home in 16 months.
The lease lasts for 2 years.
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your
doctor recommends two physical therapy programs that you can join. You are on the
waitlist for both. You will join the one that happens to have a spot available in 2 years, at
which time you will know which program to join and start the physical therapy.
Condition 6
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1. Suppose the company plans to eliminate your department in 18 months. It offers you a
5-year renewed job contract and to transfer you to another department at the end of the 18
months. Currently the company has a position at your level in one other department,
which will be a step down for you. In 18 months, the company will transfer you to this
department and you will start working in the new department.
2. Suppose someone is suing you. The first hearing will be in 14 months. It will then take
a series of court hearings that span 3 years to reach a judgment. The lawyer has thought
of a strategy for your defense. You will use this strategy to defend.
3. Suppose you lost your job recently. You plan to stay in your current apartment for
another 16 months until the lease expires, and then rent a cheaper apartment. You have
been searching apartment listings and have found one apartment building that offers
affordable housing. Just now the real estate agent told you that the building would have a
vacancy in 16 months. You plan to move into this apartment building in 16 months. The
lease lasts for 2 years.
4. Suppose you need to join a physical therapy program where a physical therapist helps
you recover from an injury and promote mobility. The program lasts for 1 year. Your
doctor recommends a physical therapy program that you can join. The program
coordinator just told you that the program would have a spot available in 2 years, at
which time you will start the physical therapy.
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Table 1. Subjective temporal distance between now and the start of future experience ("nts"), now and
the end of future experience ("nte"), duration of future experiences, by scenario, Pilot

DV

Scenario

Objective
duration
(in
"months")

(4) Valence (50=extremely
negative;
50=extremely
positive)

trip

1

36.9

apartment

1

25.58

internship

3

25.64

graduate
school

18

21.15

trip

1.5

36.9

apartment

13

25.58

(1) nts

(2) nte

M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N

Choice

No
choice

42.56
27.04
121
41.54
24.72
121
55.59
22.86
120
74.43
19.47
121
52.92
25.38
117
71.47
21.23
120

46.23
25.76
111
42.89
26.34
106
58.76
23.86
112
78.85
21.24
112
51.49
27.3
105
77.16
20.16
111

t

df

p

Cohen's
d

-1.1 230 0.29

0.14

-0.4 225 0.69

0.05

-1

230

0.3

0.14

-1.7 231

0.1

0.22

0.41 220 0.69

-0.05

-2.1 229 0.04

0.27

50

internship

5.5

25.64

graduate
school

42

21.15

trip

0.5

36.9

apartment

12

25.58

internship

2.5

25.64

graduate
school

24

21.15

(3)
duration

M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N

68.47
20.02
119
83
20.82
121
5.26
2.37
121
6.66
2.26
119
6.32
2.17
120
7.37
2.35
122

71.95
23.63
109
88.25
17.11
108
4.79
2.17
108
6.61
2.36
106
6.29
2.6
108
7.75
2.51
110

-1.2 226 0.23

0.16

-2.1 225 0.04

0.28

1.58 227 0.12

-0.21

0.16 223 0.87

-0.02

0.09 226 0.93

-0.01

-1.2 230 0.24

0.16
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Table 2. Subjective temporal distance between now and the start of future experience ("nts"), now and the end of
future experience ("nte"), and duration of the future experience, by scenario, Experiment 1

DV

(1) nts

Scenario

Objective
duration
(in
"months")

(4) Valence (50=extremely
negative;
50=extremely
positive).

job promotion

18

31.8

court hearing
with a high
chance of
winning

48

10.9

Choice

M
SD
N
M
SD
N

trip

24

39.49

anniversary
meal

12

28.82

job demotion

18

-16.96

court hearing
with a high

48

-34.89

M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD

61.68
25.03
243
79.28
22.62
243
75.52
23.75
243
62.7
24.3
243
54.01
28.85
243
72.58
29.5

No
choice

p

Cohen's
d

0.002

0.29

0.019

0.21

-0.59 481

0.557

0.05

-1.04 481

0.298

0.09

-3.56 481

0

0.32

-2.92 468

0.004

0.27

t

df

68.84
24.36 -3.19 481
240
83.89
20.48 -2.34 481
240
76.76
22.64
240
65.04
24.98
240
63.25
28.23
240
79.81
24.67

52

chance of
losing
routine medical
exam

(2) nte

N
60

-24.16

apartment

14

4.19

job promotion

54

31.8

court hearing
with a high
chance of
winning

48.0055

10.9

M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N

trip

26

39.49

anniversary
meal

12.0055

28.82

job demotion

54

-16.96

court hearing
with a high

48

-34.89

M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD

243

239

72.3
28.92
243
53.52
27.57
241
67.33
25.58
243
78
24.46

77.83
28.54
240
62.95
27.46
239
71.45
25.47
237
82.27
21.32

243

240

72.71
26.29
242
62.59
25.77
241
64.47
29.48
243
74.72
27.49

-2.12 481

0.035

0.19

-3.75 478

0

0.34

-1.77 478

0.077

0.16

-2.04 474

0.041

0.19

0.783

-0.03

0.172

0.13

0.066

0.17

0.12

0.14

72.05
26.24 0.28 480
240
65.76
24.89 -1.37 477
238
69.3
28.08 -1.84 481
240
78.47
-1.56 479
25.28

53

chance of
losing

(3)
duration

N

routine
medical exam

60.0028

-24.16

apartment

38

4.19

job promotion

36

31.8

court hearing
with a high
chance of
winning

0.0055

10.9

trip

2

39.49

anniversary
meal

0.0055

28.82

job demotion

36

-16.96

court hearing
with a high

0.0055

-34.89

M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD

241
75.65
26.96
243
63.06
25.85
241
6.96
2.57
242
5.46
3.54

240

N

243

80.18
25.68 -1.89 481
240
69.87
26.64 -2.84 477
238
7.27
2.72 -1.26 479
239
5.21
3.58 0.77 481
240

M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD

5.38
3.08
243
6.49
3.02
242
7.56
2.84
243
6.81
3.48

5.52
2.96 -0.49 479
238
6.18
3.18 1.12 479
239
7.89
2.69 -1.3 481
240
6.84
0.1 480
3.65

0.059

0.17

0.005

0.26

0.207

0.12

0.444

-0.07

0.627

0.05

0.264

-0.1

0.193

0.12

0.922

0.01

54

chance of
losing
routine
medical exam

0.0028

-24.16

apartment

24

4.19

N

242

240

M
SD
N
M
SD
N

6.64
3.54
242
6.29
2.9
240

6.99
3.73 -1.05 480
240
6.58
2.83 -1.08 478
240

0.296

0.1

0.279

0.1
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Table 3. Condition Summary for Experiment 2
Factor
Condition
1
2
3
4
The two conditions compared to test each factor
Future experience
determined by a
X
X
choice or a random
factor
Time to determine
the future
X
X
experience
Time to know the
X
X
future experience
Presence of
X
uncertainty
A lower or higher
non-zero level of
uncertainty: number
of options, given
that there are more
than 1 option

X

5

6

X

X

A description of the factors for each condition
Future experience
determined by a
choice or a random
factor

choice

random
factor

random
factor

random
factor

random
factor

random
factor
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Time to determine
the future
experience
Time to know the
future experience
Number of options

around the
start of the
experience

around the
by now
by now
around the
by now
start of the
(already
(already
start of the
(already
experience determined) determined) experience determined)

around the
start of the
experience
5

around the
start of the
experience
5

around the
start of the
experience
5

by now
(already
known)
5

around the
start of the
experience
2

by now
(already
known)
1

57

Table 4. Subjective temporal distance between now and the start of future experience ("nts") by scenario,
Experiment 2

DV

nts

Scenario

Valence (Objective
50=extremely
duration
negative;
(in
50=extremely
"months")
positive).

job
demotion

18

-8.72

defendant
of a
lawsuit

14

-28.75

apartment

24

11.58

physical
therapy

16

5.31

M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N
M
SD
N

1

2

3

4

5

6

47.24
25.43
222
50.83
26.7
222
53.32
24.23
222
67.4
25.17
222

51.22
25.69
220
61.11
26.38
220
55.46
23.95
220
74.57
22.53
220

53.79
28.84
222
62.3
26.85
223
60.44
23.78
222
75.58
21.33
223

50.29
26.69
217
55.47
27.41
217
59.01
24.27
217
79.08
22.72
217

47.77
27.07
215
63.05
27.66
216
58.1
25.05
215
78.57
21.4
216

48.35
27.52
218
56.91
28.57
218
59.77
24.62
217
80.01
22.47
219

Cohen's d
between
Condition
1 and 6
0.04

0.22

0.26

0.53
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Figure 1. The primary measure, i.e., the subjective temporal distance between now and
the start of the future experience, displayed on the Qualtrics survey for the trip scenario.
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Figure 2. Mean z-scored subjective temporal distance from now to the start of the future
experience (“nts”) by condition (Pilot, Experiment 1 and 2). Error bars indicate standard
errors of the mean.
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CHAPTER 2
Valence and Culture Affect Sequence Preference
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Abstract
The present research examines the effects of valence and culture on sequence preference
for everyday life experiences. It differs from prior work in that 1) it compares sequence
preferences of symmetrical positive and negative events in the same domain, and 2) it
explores sequence preference, for the first time, in a non-Western culture (Asian India),
in comparison to Americans. The results from two studies showed that, when given a
choice of ascending, descending and other sequences, people were more likely to prefer
an ascending sequence for negative experiences than positive experiences, and that
people were more likely to prefer a descending sequence for positive experiences than
negative experiences. They also showed that Americans were more likely to prefer an
ascending sequence than Indians and that Indians were more likely to prefer a descending
sequence than Americans. Despite the cultural difference, the majority of Americans and
Indians showed a preference for an ascending sequence for life experience as a whole.
People have shown a medium to large level of individual consistency in their sequence
preference. We discussed each motivation to prefer an ascending or a descending
sequence noted in Frederick and Lowenstein (2008) in light of the valence and cultural
effects.
Keywords: sequence preference, experience, valence, culture
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Valence and Culture Affect Sequence Preference
Prior research based on western samples has found that people generally prefer an
ascending sequence when given a choice between an ascending sequence and a
descending sequence for positive as well as negative events (e.g., Loewenstein &
Sicherman, 1991; see Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008 for a discussion on the limitations
of the finding). Prior research has not systematically examined the sequence preference
for everyday life experiences. Everyday life experiences constitute a large part of
people’s daily experiences. Everyday life experiences can become more appealing when
arranged in a preferred sequence. For example, a restaurant that presents dishes with a
preferred sequence on a tasting menu may attract more customers and/or provide a more
pleasant dining experience. The presentation sequence of negative experiences may
influence preferences. It is possible to alter the sequences of experiences to facilitate
desirable outcomes. For example, doctors may design a treatment plan with a better
medical outcome in a preferred sequence to increase the chance that patients opt in for
the treatment plan. Teachers may design the reading assignments in a preferred sequence
to increase the chance that the students work on the assignments.
1. In the present research, we examine the valence effect of sequence preference.
Is there a difference in sequence preference for positive versus negative situations? The
asymmetry between the positive and the negative has been noted in the prior literature
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). For
example, negative potency indicates that negative entities are stronger than the equivalent
positive entities. As noted by Frederick and Loewenstein (2008), people may prefer an

63

ascending sequence to increase the positive anticipation and decrease the dread (Berns, et
al., 2006; Loewenstein, 1987). Dread may be stronger than the positive anticipation due
to negative potency, which may drive people to show a stronger preference for an
ascending sequence for negative than for positive situations.
In fact, prior research has suggested that people may show a stronger preference
for an ascending sequence for negative than positive situations. For example, Frederick
and Loewenstein (2008) asked participants to specify their preferred allocation of 30
events, such as 30 headaches, over an 8 year interval. More people chose an ascending
sequence for negative experiences such as headaches than positive experiences such as
massages or sushi dinners, and more people chose a descending sequence for such
positive experiences than for such negative experiences (see Table 3 in Frederick &
Loewenstein, 2008, Study 1a and 1b). Frederick and Loewenstein (2008) noted that
people showed a greater disposition to accelerate bads than to postpone goods because
aversive dread was more potent than pleasurable anticipation. In the present research, we
created symmetrical positive and negative experiences, and examined the effect of
valence on sequence preference.
It is possible that the preferred sequence of events may be at least partly a
function of culture. Prior research on sequence preference has used western samples.
Most studies used American samples (e.g., Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993;
Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991). Some studies included Canadian (e.g., Redelmeier &
Kahneman, 1996) and UK samples (e.g., Read & Powell, 2002). No study to our
knowledge has compared the sequence preference between U.S. Americans and any nonWestern group; the present research examines this by comparing Americans and Indians.
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Prior research has identified differences between Asian Indian cultures or more
generally, South and East Asian countries and North Americans. For example, when
asked to indicate which of “anger, happiness, shame” did not belong with the other two,
Americans tended to pick “happiness” because it was the only positive item, whereas
Indians were much more likely to pick “anger” because it was an emotion that was
socially disruptive, whereas the other two, “happiness” and “shame”, were socially
constructive emotions (Menon & Shweder, 1997; Rozin, 2003). More generally, the more
communal South and East Asian countries seem to privilege communal values over
individualistic values (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Communal frameworks tend to focus
less on the pleasure dimension.
One of the reasons for people to choose an ascending sequence, as noted in
Frederick and Loewenstein (2008), was that people extended the presented sequences
according to the trends. For example, people may have projected an ascending sequence
such as (5, 6, 7) to (5, 6, 7, 8) and a descending sequence such as (7, 6, 5) to (7, 6, 5, 4).
Because the ascending sequence has a projected sequence with a higher total value,
people prefer an ascending sequence. It has been shown that when predicting a trend,
North Americans tended to predict a linear trend (e.g., what has been going up will
continue to go up), whereas East Asians tended to predict a cyclical trend (e.g., what has
been going up will go down) (Ji, 2005). Although not directly tested on Indians, the
results suggest that there may be South/East Asian versus American differences in terms
of how people predict trend, which according to Frederick and Loewenstein (2008), may
affect people’s preference for an ascending sequence.
2. In the present research, we compared the sequence preference between U.S.
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Americans and Asian Indians to examine whether the preference for an ascending
sequence was generalizable beyond the western sample, and to explore possible cultural
differences between Americans and Indians in sequence preference.
3. To what extent does sequence preference show individual consistency? Does
favoring ascending (or descending) sequences in one domain correlate with favoring the
same in other domains? Most studies examined the relationships of sequence preference
in domains such as money, health, environment, career, etc. (e.g. Chapman, 1996a;
Chapman, 1996b; Chapman, & Elstein, 1995; Hardisty & Weber, 2009; Schoenfelder &
Hantula, 2003). There were mixed findings regarding whether people showed consistency
across such domains. Whereas some studies found little consistency of preference across
such domains (Chapman, 1996a; Chapman, 1996b; Duffy & Smith, 2013; Schoenfelder
& Hantula, 2003); other studies found consistency of preference across some domains
(Chapman & Weber, 2006; Hardisty & Weber, 2009). We extended these studies by
exploring a set of 14 everyday experiences. For example, do people prefer to eat dishes in
a meal in the same sequence that they prefer to make phone calls?
4. What is the sequence preference for life experience as a whole? We asked
participants to indicate their sequence preference for a whole life experience, and
compared the results with their sequence preference for everyday life experiences. We
examined whether everyday life experiences differed from the whole life experience in
terms of preferred sequence.
In two studies, we asked participants to indicate their sequence preferences in
various everyday life experiences, balanced across negative and positive sequences, or
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life experience as a whole, and explored their responses with an emphasis of the four
questions noted above.
Study 11
Method
Two hundred and thirty eight Mturk Americans and 455 Mturk Indians
participated in the study. 512 Mturk workers completed the online survey and 408 passed
all five catch questions and were included in the analysis. An example of a catch question
was “please add 3 to 54 and put the answer in the box.” The analysis included 190 Mturk
Americans (64.7% female; mean age = 36.3) and 218 Mturk Indians (35.8% female;
mean age = 31.3)2.
Participants were asked to select the sequence in which they prefer to proceed in
fourteen scenarios. For example, participants were asked, “if you have a plan to eat three
dishes on the same platter in a meal right now (e.g., meat, potatoes and a vegetable), and
you like all of the dishes, in which order do you prefer to proceed? ” In this scenario, the
participants were asked to indicate their preferences to order three positive items of the
same sort. For each positive scenario, we created a corresponding negative scenario,
which for the meal scenario was, “if you have a plan to eat three dishes on the same
platter in a meal right now (e.g., meat, potatoes and a vegetable), and you dislike all of
the dishes (you are hungry and there are no alternative foods), in which order do you
prefer to proceed? ”
For each scenario, participants were presented with four options: a descending
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sequence (e.g., “I prefer to eat my most favorite dish first and eat my least favorite dish
last”), an ascending sequence (e.g., “I prefer to eat my least favorite dish first and eat my
most favorite dish last”), any other sequence (e.g., “I prefer to approach the foods in a
different order than any described above. What I prefer to do is__”) and no particular
sequence (e.g., “I prefer to not do the ordering of the foods in any particular way”).
We asked for the sequence preference for the life experience as a whole, given
that the total amount of goodness in life was constant across options, to contrast with the
sequence preference for everyday life experiences. “Suppose the curves below represent
everything you care about in your life: happiness, meaning, health, etc. The y-axis
represents how good your life is taken as a whole; the x-axis represents your age.” We
provided seven options including a descending sequence, an ascending sequence, a flat
sequence, a sequence with a peak in the middle, a sequence with a low point in the
middle, any other sequence, or indifferent to any sequence, with the first five options
each represented by a curve.
We asked participants to rank the importance of anticipation, experience, and
memory for positive and negative experiences respectively. Specifically, for positive
experiences we asked, “think of a positive experience, like going to a favorite sports
event or concert. We can talk about three aspects of this experience. First is the
anticipation of the experience: You have the ticket and enjoy thinking about going.
Second is the actual experience of the event: You are attending it. Third is the memories
of the event: You remember the different things that happened during it. This could be
immediately after the event, or days, months or years later. Generally, how important do
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you think anticipation, experience, and memories of POSITIVE experiences are for you,
in your life? Please rank the three.” For negative experiences, we asked, “think of a
negative experience, like going to see your dentist or disputing a bill. We can talk about
three aspects of this experience. First is the anticipation of the experience: You are
scheduled to see your dentist and dread going. Second is the actual experience of the
event: You are attending it. Third is the memories of the event: You remember the
different things that happened during it. This could be immediately after the event, or
days, months or years later. Generally, how important do you think anticipation,
experience, and memories of NEGATIVE experiences are for you in your life? Please
rank the three.”
Results
The basic results on sequence preference are presented in Table 1. We collapsed
the two non ascending/descending choices (other and no particular sequence) into one
“other” category. The table presents the frequency of ascending, descending, and other
choices for Americans, Indians, and for the total sample. Results for a given domain in
the positive version are followed by results for the same domain in the negative version,
with this pattern repeated for each domain.
The ascending sequence was the predominant choice for Americans in all seven
negative scenarios and five (out of seven; except for the positive meal and positive
project scenario) positive scenarios. The ascending sequence was not the predominant
choice for Indians in any scenarios. The descending sequence was the predominant
choice for Indians in all fourteen scenarios. The descending sequence was the

69

predominant choice for Americans in one (positive project) out of the fourteen scenarios.
We created binary variables for each scenario to indicate an ascending (or a descending)
sequence was chosen or not, and averaged the binary variables for an ascending (or a
descending) sequence across fourteen scenarios. The correlation between the mean
ascending and mean descending for the total sample was, r(381) = -.67, p < .001.
1. Is there a difference in sequence preference for positive versus negative
situations? Based on a paired sample t-test, the mean ascending preference for negative
scenarios (M = .41, SD = .33) was stronger than the mean ascending preference for
positive scenarios (M = .35, SD = .32), t(382) = -3.46, p = .001.
The importance ranking of positive anticipation didn’t correlate with the
preference for an ascending sequence for positive experiences, r(347) = -.03, p = .573,
and the importance ranking of dread didn’t correlate with the preference for an ascending
sequence for negative experiences, r(322) = -.05, p = .372. The results were in the right
direction that a higher ranking of positive anticipation or dread corresponded to a
stronger preference for an ascending sequence. Based on a paired sample t-test, the mean
descending preference for positive scenarios (M = .47, SD = .35) was stronger than the
mean descending preference for negative scenarios (M = .36, SD = .34), t(382) = 6.34, p
< .001.
Is there a difference in the value placed on anticipation by valence?
Negative anticipation was ranked as more important than the positive anticipation by a
paired-sample t test that compared the rankings of the positive (M = 2.42, SD = .76) and
negative anticipation (M = 2.06, SD = .79), t(313) = 5.93, p < .001. This finding is
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consistent with the position that anticipation importance may play a role in the
predominance of ascending in the negative situation.
2. Is there a difference in sequence preference between Americans and Indians?
Based on an independent sample t-test, the mean ascending preference for Americans (M
= .48, SD = .30) was stronger than the mean ascending preference for Indians (M = .29,
SD = .24), t(345) = 6.54, p < .001. Is there a difference in the value placed on anticipation
by culture? For positive experiences, Indians (M = 2.38, SD = .75) rated anticipation
higher than Americans (M = 2.52, SD = .72), t(355) = 1.77, p = .078, but not
significantly. For negative experiences, Americans (M = 2.04, SD = .78) rated
anticipation higher than Indians (M = 2.09, SD = .82), t(338) = -.50, p = .618, again not a
significant difference. Therefore, we cannot use anticipation importance to explain the
cultural difference in their preference for an ascending sequence. Based on an
independent sample t-test, the mean ascending preference for Indians (M = .55, SD = .28)
was stronger than the mean ascending preference for Americans (M = .26, SD = .25),
t(381) = -10.52, p < .001.
3. To what extent does sequence preference show individual consistency? The
correlations between the binary variables for an ascending sequence among the fourteen
scenarios were all positive, ranging from r(404) = .09, p = .075 to r(403) = .56, p < .001,
with an average correlation of r = .29, which approached a medium level of consistency.
The correlations between the descending sequence binary variables among the fourteen
scenarios were all positive, ranging from r(404) = .15, p < .01 to r(401) = .59, p < .001,
with an average correlation of r = .33, which suggested a medium level of consistency.
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4. What is the sequence preference for life experience as a whole? Despite their
differences in sequence preference regarding everyday life experiences, more than half of
Americans as well as Indians preferred an ascending sequence for the life experience
taken as a whole (Table 2)3. The distribution of sequence preference was contingent on
the culture, χ2 (6) = 18.68, p = .005. To test the cultural difference in the preference for an
ascending (or descending) sequence, we created a binary variable to represent an
ascending (or descending) sequence was chosen or not. Independent sample t-tests
showed that Indians (M = .05, SD = .22) were more likely to prefer a descending
sequence compared to Americans (M = .02, SD = .12), t(697.88) = -2.75, p = .006. There
was a trend that Americans (M = .55, SD = .50) were more likely to prefer an ascending
sequence compared to Indians (M = .51, SD = .50), though the difference was not
significant, t(821) = 1.03, p = .306.
Study 2
In Study 1, for each experience, the positive scenario was presented first, followed by the
corresponding negative scenario. All participants responded to the questions in the same
order. To rule out the possibility that the display order of valence accounted for the
valence difference observed in Study 1, Study 2 counterbalanced the display order of
valence.
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Method
Four hundred and ninety two Mturk Americans participated in the study. 469
(44.6% female; mean age = 37.29) participants passed all five catch questions and were
included in the analysis.
Participants were randomly assigned to respond to either seven positive scenarios
first (n = 233), or seven negative scenarios first (n = 236). For the seven scenarios of the
same valence, we randomized the order in which they were presented for each
participant. Participants were asked to select the sequence in which they prefer to proceed
in the same fourteen scenarios as in Study 1 except that each scenario only consisted of
two exemplars instead of three (e.g., two dishes in a meal rather than three). For each
scenario, we presented three options: a descending sequence (e.g., “I prefer to eat the dish
that I like better first”), an ascending sequence (e.g., “I prefer to eat the dish that I like
better second”) and “neither of above.”
We also asked participants to respond to the importance ranking questions, which
were the same as in Study 1, with the display order of valence counterbalanced.
Participants who responded to the seven positive (or negative) scenarios first also
responded to the positive (or negative) importance ranking question first.
Results
The basic results on sequence preference are presented in Table 3. In fourteen out
of the fourteen scenarios, ascending was the predominant choice. The percent of
participants who preferred an ascending sequence ranged from 46.7% to 68.4% (out of
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three choices). Based on this American sample, the preference for an ascending sequence
was generalized to everyday life experiences across situations. We created binary
variables for each scenario to indicate an ascending (or a descending) sequence was
chosen or not, and averaged the binary variables for an ascending (or a descending)
sequence across fourteen scenarios. The mean ascending correlated with mean
descending at r(467) = -.93, p < .001.
1. Is there a difference in sequence preference for positive versus negative
situations? Based on a paired sample t-test, the mean ascending preference for negative
scenarios (M = .60, SD = .34) was stronger than the mean ascending preference for
positive scenarios (M = .57, SD = .36), t(468) = -1.95, p = .051, though the results did not
quite reach a significant level.
The importance ranking of positive anticipation didn’t correlate with the
preference for an ascending sequence for positive experiences, r(440) = -.03, p = .516.
The correlation between the importance ranking of dread and the preference for an
ascending sequence for negative experiences approached significance, r(424) = -.09, p =
.054, indicating a trend that people who found dread to be more important would prefer
an ascending sequence for negative experiences.
Is there a difference in the value placed on anticipation by valence? The
negative anticipation was ranked as more important than the positive anticipation by a
paired-sample t test that compared the rankings of the positive (M = 2.53, SD = .70) and
negative anticipation (M = 1.99, SD = .81), t(403) = 10.97, p < .001.
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Based on a paired sample t-test, the mean descending preference for positive
scenarios (M = .40, SD = .36) was stronger than the mean descending preference for
negative scenarios (M = .34, SD = .32), t(468) = 5.43, p < .001.
3. To what extent does sequence preference show individual consistency? The
correlations between the binary variables for an ascending sequence among the fourteen
scenarios were all positive, ranging from r(422) = .21, p < .001 to r(422) = .64, p < .001,
with an average correlation of r = .40, which indicated a medium to large level of
consistency. The correlations between the descending sequence binary variables among
the fourteen scenarios were all positive, ranging from r(420) = .21, p < .001 to r(420) =
.64, p < .001, with an average correlation of r = .40, which indicated a medium to large
level of consistency.
Discussion
The valence effect appeared to be robust in Study 2, where the display order of
valence was counterbalanced, the display order of the seven scenarios for each valence
was randomized for each participant, two instead of three exemplars were used for each
scenario, and three options (i.e., ascending sequence, descending sequence, neither) were
presented.
For the preference for an ascending sequence, the valence effect approached
significance, t(468) = -1.95, p = .051, while in Study 1 it was significant, t(382) = 6.34, p
< .001. It may be because that in Study 1, the negative scenario was presented right after
the corresponding positive scenario for the same experience, while in Study 2, we
presented seven positive (or negative) scenarios first, and then the corresponding seven
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negative (or positive) scenarios. The contrast of valence for each experience may be more
salient in Study 1 compared to Study 2.
General Discussion
In two studies, we examined sequence preference in everyday life experiences and
life experience as a whole. We have found a valence effect and a cultural difference
(between Americans and Indians) on sequence preference. Despite the cultural difference,
the majority of Americans and Indians showed a preference for an ascending sequence
for life experience as a whole. People have shown a medium to large level of individual
consistency in their sequence preference.
1. Is there a difference in sequence preference for positive versus negative
situations? Prior research suggested that more people chose an ascending sequence for
negative experiences such as headaches than positive experiences such as massages or
sushi dinners, and more people chose a descending sequence for such positive
experiences than for such negative experiences (see Table 3 in Frederick & Loewenstein,
2008, Study 1a and 1b). However, such studies didn't aim to test for the valence effect
and therefore didn’t isolate the valence factor. In the present research, we created
symmetrical positive and negative scenarios that were different only in valence and
isolated the valence factor. We found that people were more likely to prefer an ascending
sequence for negative experiences than positive experiences, and that people were more
likely to prefer a descending sequence for positive experiences than negative experiences.
A sizable percentage of people (e.g., 41% in Study 1) preferred an ascending sequence
for negative experiences despite of the fact that such a sequence presented them with the
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most negative experience first. The evolutionary standpoint suggests that the delay of the
most negative experience, which may indicate the greatest danger, maximizes the chance
of survival. The results suggest that the preference for an ascending sequence is stronger
than the evolutionary instinct to delay the most negative experience.
2. Is there a difference in sequence preference between Americans and Indians?
We believe this was the first time that sequence preference was examined with a sample
outside of the western culture. We recruited participants and contrasted their sequence
preference with that of the Americans. We found significant cultural differences.
Americans were more likely to prefer an ascending sequence than Indians and that
Indians were more likely to prefer a descending sequence than Americans, even for the
life experience taken as a whole, when the majority of Americans as well as Indians
preferred an ascending sequence.
The cultural difference suggests that being sensitive to each culture’s unique
sequence preference may help to tailor experiences or products to appeal to the particular
culture. For example, 63.8% Indians preferred a descending sequence for a positive trip,
whereas 55.3% Americans preferred an ascending sequence for a positive trip. In order to
attract more Indian customers to a positive trip, e.g., design an experience on a cruise trip,
it may be more appealing to use a descending sequence to arrange the activities on the
cruise. If the potential customers were Americans, it may be more appealing to use an
ascending sequence to arrange the activities on the cruise.
Prior research showed that the real-time evaluation of the end of an experience
was significantly correlated with the retrospective global evaluation of the pleasant
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experience with American samples (Frederickson & Kahneman, 1993), which suggested
that, given the same pleasant experiences, an ascending sequence would be evaluated as a
better experience than a descending sequence according to Americans. This discrepancy
may be due to a difference of culture or a prospective versus retrospective evaluation of
an experience.
3. To what extent does sequence preference show individual consistency? For the
total sample, there are 91 possible pairings of two scenarios from the set of 14. The
correlations were all positive. The individual’s sequence preference was consistent across
domains. The consistency level across scenarios for an ascending sequence was r = .29 in
Study 1 and r = .40 in Study 2; for a descending sequence was r = .33, in Study 1 and r =
.40 in Study 2, indicating a medium to large level of consistency for sequence preference
across scenarios.
4. What is the sequence preference for life experience as a whole? We found a
strong preference for the ascending life course in both Americans (54.7% ascending) and
Indians (51% ascending).
Frederick and Loewenstein (2008) have shown that different elicitation
procedures may produce different responses in sequence preference. For example, they
showed that the preference for an ascending sequence documented with a choice task
disappeared when using allocation or pricing tasks. Our studies used a choice task, the
standard elicitation procedure for sequence preference, and thus caution should be
exercised when generalizing the results to other elicitation procedures. There are a
number of other limitations of the present research, including using only Mturk samples
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and self report data without any real choices.
Building on prior research, Frederick and Loewenstein (2008) noted three factors
that favored an ascending sequence. 1) By saving the better outcomes for later, people
increased the positive anticipation and decreased the dread (Berns, et al., 2006;
Loewenstein, 1987). 2) People experienced a series of gains relative to the last outcome
(Helson, 1964). 3) The respondents extended the presented sequences according to the
trends. For example, the sequence (5, 6, 7) might have been projected as (5, 6, 7, 8...) and
thus was preferred to (7, 6, 5), which might have been projected as (7, 6, 5, 4...), because
they offered different totals. They also noted three factors that favored a descending
sequence, including 1) the uncertainty about whether the later outcome would occur; 2)
the opportunity cost of delaying the better outcomes; and 3) pure time preference (i.e.,
people cared less about outcomes that were more temporally remote).
We discuss each of the motivations to prefer an ascending or a descending
sequence noted in Frederick and Lowenstein (2008) in light of the valence and cultural
effects. Frederick and Lowenstein (2008) have noted three motivations to prefer an
ascending sequence. The first motivation is to increase positive anticipation and decrease
dread. Is the valence effect or/and the cultural effect related to anticipation? We tested the
relationship between the importance ranking of anticipation (out of anticipation,
experience and memory) and the preference for an ascending sequence. On the individual
level, the correlations between the anticipation preference and the ascending sequence
preference were not significant, but in the predicted direction, that a person who values
anticipation more would show a stronger preference for an ascending sequence. On a
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group level, negative anticipation (dread) was rated as more important than positive
anticipation. This finding is consistent with the position that anticipation importance may
play a role in the predominance of ascending in the negative situation. There was no
significant difference in the value placed on anticipation by culture. Hence this could not
be used to account for Indian-American differences in ascending sequence preference.
The second motivation to prefer an ascending sequence is to experience gains
relative to the last outcome. This motivation applies for both positive and negative
experiences. It is possible that people would perceive such gains (i.e., the difference
between two consecutive elements in a sequence) to be larger for negative experiences
compared to for positive experience due to negative potency (Baumeister et al., 2001;
Rozin & Royzman, 2001); the larger perceived gains relative to the last outcome in a
negative experience (compared to a positive experience) leads people to show a stronger
preference for an ascending for the negative experience (compared to positive
experience). There is no obvious reason why Americans and Asian Indians would be
different in this aspect.
The third motivation to prefer an ascending sequence is that people extend the
trends according to the existing sequence, and the extended trends based on an ascending
sequence yields a higher total value (compared to the extended trends based on a
descending sequence). The positive and negative experience can both be extended. For
positive experiences, suppose the ascending sequence is (5, 6, 7), which will be extended
to (5, 6, 7, 8); the descending sequence is (7, 6, 5), which will be extended to (7, 6, 5, 4).
In this case, the total value of the extended ascending sequence is 26, and the total value
of the extended descending sequence is 22. For negative experiences, suppose the
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ascending sequence is (-7, -6, -5), which will be extended to (-7, -6, -5, -4); the
descending sequence is (-5, -6, -7), which will be extended to (-5, -6, -7, -8). In this case,
the total value for the extended ascending sequence is -22, and the total value of the
extended descending sequence is -26. It seems that in both cases, the extended ascending
sequence is up by 4 in total value compared to the descending sequence. However, this is
based on the assumption, for any specific sequence, the numerical value equals the
perceived value. If people perceive the negative to be more intense compared to the
positive (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), then the extended elements
of -4 (ascending) and -8 (descending) for the negative experiences would be perceived to
be more intense compared to 4 (descending) and 8 (ascending) for the positive
experiences. For example, at a 1.5 inflation rate, -4 and -8 will be perceived as -6 and -12.
Then the difference between -4 and -8 would be perceived as larger compared to the
difference between 8 and 4. If so, the difference in total value will be larger between the
ascending and the descending for the negative experiences compared to positive
experiences. Therefore, people should show a stronger preference for an ascending
preference for negative experiences compared to for positive experiences.
There may be a cultural difference in how people extend the trends. The literature
has only noted the cultural difference between the East Asians and North Americans in
terms of how they predict future trends. East Asians were more likely to predict cyclical
trends (e.g., what has been going up will go down) compared to North Americans, and
North Americans were more likely to predict linear trends (e.g., what has been going up
will continue to go up) compared to East Asians (Ji, 2005). That is, based on a sequence
of (5, 6, 7), East Asians may predict the reversal such as (5, 6, 7, 6, 5) rather than a
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continuance of the sequence (5, 6, 7, 8, 9). The motivation to prefer an ascending
sequence based on extended trends assumes that people predict linear trends, which may
or may not be the case for Indians. There is no study on how Indians predict trends in
comparison to Americans; it is possible that the two cultures predict trends differently,
which relates to their cultural difference in sequence preference. If Indians, being a South
Asian culture, resemble East Asians in this regard rather than North Americans, and thus
predict reversals, this is consistent with the results that Indians show a weaker preference
for an ascending sequence.
Frederick and Lowenstein (2008) have noted three motivations to prefer a
descending sequence. The first motivation is based on an uncertainty about whether the
later outcome would occur, which applies to both the positive and the negative situations.
In both positive and negative experiences, the later outcome may not occur. A preference
for a descending sequence for a positive (or negative) experience indicates that the least
positive (or most negative) element, which comes later, may not occur. A preference for
an ascending sequence for a positive (or negative) experience indicates that the most
positive (or least negative) element, which comes later, may not occur. Therefore, the
motivation based on uncertainty favors a descending sequence for positive (or negative)
experience.
In terms of the valence difference, if anything, losing the most negative element
(in the case of a descending sequence) and losing the least negative element (in the case
of an ascending sequence) for a negative experience due to uncertainty may make a larger
difference compared to losing the least positive element (in the case of a descending
sequence) and losing the most positive element (in the case of an ascending sequence) for
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a positive experience, due to negative potency (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin &
Royzman, 2001). Therefore, in consideration of the uncertainty factor, the difference
between the ascending and the descending is larger in negative than in positive situations.
Thus people should show a stronger preference for a descending sequence for a negative
experience. It is possible that the two cultures differ in terms of perceived level of
uncertainty. A culture that perceives a higher level of uncertainty should show a stronger
preference for a descending sequence. If Indians perceive a higher level of uncertainty
compared to Americans, this is consistent with Indians’ stronger preference for a
descending sequence.
The second motivation to prefer a descending sequence is based on the
opportunity cost of delaying the better outcomes. This motivation is mostly related to
sequences of monetary gains, because monetary gains can be invested and accumulate
returns. The present research used everyday life experiences as domains to test the
sequence preferences, and such everyday life experiences cannot be invested with
monetary returns.
The third motivation to prefer a descending sequence is temporal discounting.
According to this motivation, the later outcome will be discounted; if the later outcome is
of a higher value, it will be discounted more. For example, at the same discount rate of
30%, $10 will be discounted by $3, and $1 will only be discounted by $.3. Therefore,
with temporal discounting, it is preferable to have a later outcome of a lower value, i.e., a
descending sequence, compared to a later outcome of a higher value, i.e., an ascending
sequence. The higher the discount rate is, the more the later outcome will be discounted.
For example, $10 will be discounted by $3 based on a 30% discount rate, and will be
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discounted by $6 based on a 60% discount rate. At a higher discount rate, it is even more
preferable to arrange the element of a lower value to be the later outcome, i.e., a
descending sequence. Therefore, there should be a stronger preference for a descending
sequence at a higher discount rate.
There is evidence that gains are discounted more than losses (e.g., Appelt,
Hardisty & Weber, 2011). Based on the temporal discounting factor, people should show
a stronger preference for a descending sequence for gains compared to losses. This is
consistent with the valence effect that people show a stronger preference for a descending
sequence for positive experiences compared to negative experiences, and could
potentially explain the valence effect.
Prior research shows that some Indians may show a longer term future
orientation, which is consistent with a lower discount rate of future outcomes, compared
to Americans (Sundberg, Poole & Tyler, 1983). Based on the logic stated above, the
culture with a lower discount rate of future outcomes, i.e., Indians, should show a weaker
preference for a descending sequence. This is inconsistent with the cultural difference
that the Indians show a stronger preference for a descending sequence compared to North
Americans.
We discussed each motivation for an ascending or a descending sequence in light
of the valence and cultural effects, and noted some possible mechanisms for the valence
and cultural effects. Future research may investigate the potential mechanisms for the
valence effect. For example, future studies could test if the discount rate mediates the
relationship between valence and a preference for a descending sequence; that is, whether
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the direct effect of valence on a descending sequence preference is reduced or becomes
zero when the discount rate is controlled for.
Future research may investigate the mechanisms of the cultural difference in
sequence preference. For example, future studies may compare how Indians and
Americans predict future trends, whether Indians predict cyclical trends more than
Americans, and whether the way they predict trends mediates the relationship between
culture and an ascending sequence preference. Future studies may also investigate how
the two cultures compare in their perceived uncertainty of whether the later outcomes
would occur, and if this factor mediates the relationship between culture and a
descending sequence preference.
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Footnotes
1. We conducted another study to replicate the findings from Study 1 and examine if they
can be generalized to behavioral tendency (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). 201 Mturk
Americans (62.2% female) and 215 Mturk Indians (33.5% female) indicated the sequence
in which they usually chose to organize their experiences.
The ascending sequence was the predominant choice for Americans in seven out
of fourteen scenarios. The descending sequence was the predominant choice for Indians
in all fourteen scenarios. For ascending sequence, we found that (1) people were more
likely to choose an ascending sequence for negative experiences (M = .30, SD = .29) than
for positive experiences (M = .26, SD = .27), t(400) = -4.51, p < .001. (2) Americans (M
= .29, SD = .25) were more likely to choose an ascending sequence than Indians (M =
.27, SD = .27), but the cultural difference was not significant, t(399) = .50, p = .62. (3)
The importance ranking of positive anticipation didn’t correlate with the tendency to
choose an ascending sequence for positive experiences, r(359) = -.06, p = .298, and the
importance ranking of dread didn’t correlate with the tendency to choose an ascending
sequence for negative experiences, r(344) = .03, p = .571.
For descending sequence, we found that (1) people were more likely to choose a
descending sequence for positive experiences (M = .46, SD = .35) than for negative
experiences (M = .32, SD = .31), t(400) = 10.64, p < .001, and (2) Indians (M = .50, SD =
.29) were more likely to choose a descending sequence than Americans (M = .28, SD =
.27), t(399) = -7.77, p < .001. The cultural difference for an ascending sequence only
showed a right trend, and no significant results; but overall, the study replicated the
results from Study 1 and suggested that the valence and cultural differences based on
sequence preference were generalizable to behavioral tendency.
2. The Indian samples in our studies might be less representative than the American
samples because the former were limited to Indians who spoke English.
3. We asked participants from Study 1 and its replication study to respond to the same
sequence preference question for life experience as described in the method section of
Study 1. Table 2 presents the aggregated results from the two studies. There is no
counterpart behavioral tendency question for life experience.
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Table 1. Sequence preference by valence and culture, N (%)
(The category showing the largest number for each row is in bold face)
Scenario

Positive
meal

Negative
meal

Positive
phone call

Negative
phone call

Positive
project

Negative
project

Positive
trip

Negative
trip
Positive
visit
people

Culture

Ascending

Descending Other

Total

Americans

72 (37.9)

35 (18.4)

83 (43.7)

190 (100)

Indians
Total

80 (36.7)
152 (37.3)

126 (57.8)
161 (39.5)

12 (5.5)
95 (23.3)

218 (100)
408 (100)

Americans

78 (41.1)

51 (26.8)

60 (31.6)

189 (99.5)

Indians
Total

77 (35.3)
155 (38.0)

91 (41.7)
142 (34.8)

46 (21.1)
106 (26.0)

214 (98.2)
403 (98.8)

Americans

86 (45.3)

69 (36.3)

33 (17.4)

188 (98.9)

Indians
Total

51 (23.4)
137 (33.6)

145 (66.5)
214 (52.5)

22 (10.1)
55 (13.5)

218 (100)
406 (99.5)

Americans

107 (56.3)

48 (25.3)

35 (18.4)

190 (100)

Indians
Total

70 (32.1)
177 (43.4)

88 (40.4)
136 (33.3)

58 (26.6)
93 (22.8)

216 (99.1)
406 (99.5)

Americans

72 (37.9)

77 (40.5)

41 (21.6)

190 (100)

Indians
Total

60 (27.5)
132 (32.4)

138 (63.3)
215 (52.7)

20 (9.1)
61 (15.0)

218 (100)
408 (100)

Americans

98 (51.6)

53 (27.9)

37 (19.4)

188 (98.9)

Indians
Total

72 (33.0)
170 (41.7)

100 (45.9)
153 (37.5)

43 (19.8)
80 (19.6)

215 (98.6)
403 (98.8)

Americans

105 (55.3)

40 (21.1)

45 (23.7)

190 (100)

Indians
Total

61 (28.0)
166 (40.7)

139 (63.8)
179 (43.9)

18 (8.3)
63 (15.4)

218 (100)
408 (100)

Americans

108 (56.8)

35 (18.4)

46 (24.2)

189 (99.5)

Indians
Total

70 (32.1)
178 (43.6)

106 (48.6)
141 (34.6)

41 (18.8)
87 (21.3)

217 (99.5)
406 (99.5)

Americans

94 (49.5)

46 (24.2)

49 (25.8)

189 (99.5)

Indians
Total

58 (26.6)
152 (37.3)

128 (58.7)
174 (42.6)

29 (13.4)
78 (19.1)

215 (98.6)
404 (99.0)

Chi
square:
India vs
American
χ2(2) =
103.49, p
< .001
χ2(2) =
11.62, p =
.003
χ2(2) =
36.11, p <
.001
χ2(2) =
23.62, p <
.001
χ2(2) =
23.82, p <
.001
χ2(2) =
17.13, p <
.001
χ2(3) =
76.43, p <
.001
χ2(2) =
42.42, p <
.001
χ2(2) =
50.84, p <
.001
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Negative
visit
people
Positive
video clip

Negative
video clip

Americans

101 (53.2)

49 (25.8)

40 (21.1)

190 (100)

Indians
Total

63 (28.9)
164 (40.2)

104 (47.7)
153 (37.5)

51 (23.4)
91 (22.3)

218 (100)
408 (100)

Americans

80 (42.1)

49 (25.8)

61 (32.1)

190 (100)

Indians
Total

60 (27.5)
140 (34.3)

132 (60.6)
181 (44.4)

24 (11)
85 (20.8)

216 (99.1)
406 (99.5)

Americans

97 (51.1)

40 (21.1)

52 (27.4)

189 (99.5)

Indians
Total

61 (28.0)
158 (38.7)

106 (48.6)
146 (35.8)

50 (22.9)
102 (25.0)

217 (99.5)
406 (99.5)

Americans

71 (37.4)

64 (33.7)

54 (28.4)

189 (99.5)

49 (22.5)
120 (29.4)

145 (66.5)
209 (51.2)

24 (11.1)
78 (19.1)

218 (100)
407 (99.8)

95 (50.0)

41 (21.6)

53 (27.9)

189 (99.5)

61 (28.0)
156 (38.2)

105 (48.2)
146 (35.8)

50 (22.9)
103 (25.2)

216 (99.1)
405 (99.3)

Positive
read article Indians
Total

Americans

Negative
read article Indians
Total

χ2(2) =
28.12, p <
.001
χ2(2) =
55.59, p <
.001
χ2(2) =
36.32, p <
.001
χ2(2) =
45.13, p <
.001
χ2(2) =
33.90, p <
.001
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Table 2. Sequence preference for the life experience as a whole by culture, N (%)
Peak in
Low in
Ascending Descending Flat
Other
mid life
mid life
Americans 214 (54.7) 6 (1.5)
102 (26.1) 28 (7.2)
15 (3.8)
14 (3.6)
Indians
221 (51.0) 21 (4.8)
109 (25.2) 44 (10.2)
22 (5.1)
3 (.7)

Indifferent

Total

12 (3.1)
12 (2.8)

391 (100)
432 (99.8)
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Table 3. Sequence preference by valence from Study 2, N (%)
(The category showing the largest number for each row is in bold face)
Domain
Valence
Ascending Descending Neither
Total
Positive
249 (53.1) 173 (36.9) 47 (10.0)
469 (100)
Meal
Negative
251 (53.5) 185 (39.4) 33 (7.0)
469 (100)
Positive
269 (57.4) 160 (34.1) 38 (8.1)
99.6 (100)
Phone call
Negative
280 (59.7) 163 (34.8) 26 (5.5)
469 (100)
Positive
238 (50.7) 207 (44.1) 24 (5.1)
469 (100)
Project
Negative
282 (60.1) 157 (33.5) 30 (6.4)
469 (100)
Positive
301 (64.2) 144 (30.7) 23 (4.9)
468 (99.8)
Trip
Negative
321 (68.4) 119 (25.4) 29 (6.2)
469 (100)
Positive
297 (63.3) 130 (27.7) 40 (8.5)
467 (99.6)
Visit
people
Negative
308 (65.7) 120 (25.6) 40 (8.5)
468 (99.8)
Positive
228 (48.6) 208 (44.3) 32 (6.8)
468 (99.8)
Video clip
Negative
259 (55.2) 170 (36.2) 39 (8.3)
468 (99.8)
Positive
219 (46.7) 208 (44.3) 42 (9.0)
469 (100)
Read
article
Negative
243 (51.8) 185 (39.4) 40 (8.5)
468 (99.8)
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Figure 1. The first five options each accompanied by a curve in the sequence preference
question for the life experience as a whole. The remaining two options were: any other
sequence, or indifferent to any sequence.
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CHAPTER 3
Cultural Differences Between East Asian and North American in Temporal
Orientation

This chapter originally appeared as Gao, X. (2016). Cultural differences between East
Asian and North American in temporal orientation. Review of General Psychology, 20(1),
118-127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000070. Copyright © 2016 American
Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission.
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Abstract
Based on East Asian and North American differences in holistic versus analytical
cognitive processing style and the tendency to predict cyclical versus linear trends, this
review proposes cultural differences in their temporal orientation. Building on prior
research that has compared the cultural differences on past, present, and future
orientation, this review hypothesizes that East Asians focus on the past and future more
than North Americans, and North Americans focus on the present more than East Asians.
It is suggested that in addition to a cultural difference in the focus on the 3 temporal
domains, when moving from any past or future time point toward the present, North
Americans’ focus on the temporal domain grows more than East Asians’ focus. I present
evidence in three categories based on how temporal orientation is defined. Specially, I
compare East Asians’ and North Americans’ focus on a temporal domain, their mental
representation of a temporal domain and their subjective temporal distance to a temporal
domain.
Keywords: cultural difference, East Asian, temporal orientation, time orientation, time
perspective
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Cultural Differences Between East Asian and North American in Temporal Orientation
1

How do East Asians and North Americans differ in their temporal orientations?
Guo, Ji, Spina, and Zhang (2012) have noted that temporal orientation describes the
cognitive involvement in (e.g., Holman & Silver, 1998; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) and the
tendency to experience emotional and behavioral reactions to the past, present, or future
(Jones, Banicky, Lasane, & Pomare, 1996; Strathman & Joireman, 2005). Time
perspective describes how the individual perceives the past and future at a given time
(Frank, 1939; Lewin, 1942). In this review, I compare East Asians’ and North
Americans’ tendency to perceive, represent, and focus on the past, present, and future. I
use the terms temporal orientation or temporal focus to refer to the extent to which a
culture attends to a specific temporal domain. This review (a) proposes theoretical bases
and a hypothesis for East Asians’ and North Americans’ cultural differences in temporal
orientations, and (b) analyzes and evaluates evidence in light of the hypothesis.
Theoretical Bases and Hypothesis
East Asian and North American cultures tend to have two distinct cognitive
processing styles, the holistic and analytical, respectively (Nisbett, 1998; Nisbett, Peng,
Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). East Asians, with a holistic cognitive
style, pay attention to the context and the relationship between the object and its context,
and prefer to explain and predict events based on this relationship. North Americans, with
an analytical cognitive style, pay attention to the primary object, assign a category to a
focal object, and prefer to explain and predict events based on the rules that apply to the
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categories. These cognitive processes require East Asians to pay attention to the past and
future to provide a context for the present, or the longer term past and future to provide a
context for the shorter term past and future. North Americans, conversely, may pay
primary attention to the present, or the shorter term past and future. The way that the
Chinese and Americans denote dates is consistent with this view. The common practice
in America is to specify a date in order of month, day, and year. In contrast, the practice
in China is to specify a date in order of year, month, and day, in which the year and
month provide a context for the day. This may suggest that in denoting time, the Chinese
consider the broader context more important compared with Americans.
When asked to predict the future based on existing trends, East Asians tend to
predict more changes and cyclical trends, that is, the future will be the reverse of the
present and past (e.g., what goes up will go down), whereas North Americans tend to
predict more stability and linear trends, that is, the future will be stable and will keep
going in the same direction (e.g., what goes up will keep going up; Ji, 2005; Ji, Nisbett, &
Su, 2001). The way people predict changes may relate to their temporal orientation (Ji,
Guo, Zhang, & Messervey, 2009). East Asians may predict cyclical trends because they
take into account longer term time horizons, which prime them with more changes. North
Americans may predict linear trends because they focus on shorter term time horizons,
which prime them with more stability (Ji et al., 2009). In fact, when induced to take a
shorter term temporal perspective, both European Canadians and Chinese predicted more
stable patterns and fewer reversals (Guo & Ji, 2008).
These theoretical views suggest that, compared with North Americans, East
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Asians have a stronger temporal focus on the longer term time horizon, and compared
with East Asians, North Americans have a stronger temporal focus on the shorter term
time horizon. This review therefore hypothesizes that East Asians focus on the past and
future more than North Americans, and North Americans focus on the present more than
East Asians.
Taking a step further, this review proposes a speculation about how the cultural
difference in temporal orientation changes with respect to the present time point. The
notion that East Asians have a stronger temporal focus on the longer term time horizon
compared with North Americans, and North Americans have a stronger temporal focus
on the shorter term time horizon compared with East Asians suggests the following (see
Figure 1): First, when applied to the three extreme time points, the present, and the
furthest past and future conceivable, (a) North Americans, compared with East Asians,
show a stronger temporal focus on the present; and (b) East Asians, compared with North
Americans, show a stronger temporal focus on the furthest past and future. Second,
suppose the extent of temporal focus can be represented by a linear relationship. The
dividing points are the two points of intersection, one in the past and the other in the
future temporal domain. In the areas beyond the two dividing points, East Asians show a
stronger temporal focus than North Americans; the difference between the two cultures’
temporal foci increases as the temporal orientation moves toward the further past or
future. Within the area between the two dividing points, North Americans show a
stronger temporal focus than East Asians; the difference between the two cultures’
temporal foci increases as the temporal orientation moves toward the present.
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This review therefore speculates that, for the time points to the left of the past
dividing point, East Asians show a stronger temporal focus than North Americans, and
the cultural difference is largest for the furthest past, and decreases with movement
toward the past dividing point, until there is no cultural difference at the past dividing
point. Starting from the past dividing point and moving toward the present, North
Americans show a stronger temporal focus compared with East Asians, and the cultural
difference increases and becomes the largest at the present point. In other words, when
moving from any past time point toward the present, North Americans’ focus grows more
than East Asians’ focus. The pattern for the future resembles that of the past.
To test this speculation, studies would ideally sample multiple time points in past
or/and future domains as well as the present. Such studies are very limited in number.
Most studies only include one representation for the past or future. These representations
are likely to be time points that fall outside of the two dividing points for two reasons.
First, the area between could be quite small compared with the area outside of the two
dividing points. Second, the time points outside of the two dividing points are more
representative of the past or future. Therefore, such studies are likely to find that East
Asians show a stronger focus on the past or future compared with North Americans.
Analysis of Evidence
I present studies in three categories based on how temporal orientation or time
perspective is defined and operationalized and compare cultural differences on each:
1. To what extent do East Asians and North Americans focus on each temporal
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domain?
2. How good is their mental representation of a particular temporal domain?
3. How “far away” does this temporal domain feel to them?
I present evidence on the past and future temporal domains in two separate
sections. I present evidence on the present temporal domain along with either the past or
future section because the present orientation is often compared with the past or future
orientation in the same studies.
Cultural Differences in Past Orientation
Prior research has pointed out that East Asian countries have a stronger past
orientation compared with North Americans (Block, Buggie, & Matsui, 1996; Doob,
1971; Guo et al., 2012; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Ko & Gentry, 1991; Pitta, Fung,
& Isberg, 1999; Rojas-Méndez, Davies, Omer, Chetthamrongchai, & Madran, 2002;
Spadone, 1992; Yau, 1988). I present evidence in three categories.
2

To what extent do East Asians and North Americans focus on the past? The
proposed cultural differences are reflected in how people explain events. Based in the
United States, a Chinese-language newspaper tended to explain assassination based on
the history of the assailant, whereas the U.S.-based English-language newspaper tended
to explain assassination based on the personal attributes of the assailant (Morris & Peng,
1994). This suggests that the Chinese explain events with information from the past,
whereas Americans explain events with information from the present. The Chinese and
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European Canadians were asked to indicate how relevant each piece of information was
to solving a theft crime (Ji et al., 2009). The information pieces differed in their temporal
focus, representing longer term past (e.g., 3 years ago), shorter term past (e.g., 2 weeks
ago), and present (e.g., currently). The Chinese considered information with a past
temporal focus as more relevant to the case than Canadians did. The cultural difference
on present temporal focus did not reach significance. The general trend suggests that, as
moving from longer term past toward the present, Canadians’ focus on the temporal
domain increased more than that of the Chinese.
Compared with North Americans, East Asians tend to use the past to direct
behaviors. Asian Americans showed a stronger past focus than Anglo-Americans,
whereas Anglo-Americans showed a stronger present focus than did Asian Americans
when considering whether to buy an ice cream cone (Briley & Aaker, 2007). The Chinese
wrote down more reflections based upon memories than European Americans did, such
as “I learned that practice makes perfection” (Q. Wang & Conway, 2004). Chinese
teachers were more likely to discuss students’ past mistakes in order to improve their
future performances than American teachers did (Stevenson & Stigler, 1992). In addition,
it has been proposed that marketing should connect products with past events
(Brodowsky, Granitz, & Anderson, 2008) or its history (Spears, Lin, & Mowen, 2000) for
Asian cultures. Compared with Americans, the Chinese were less likely to switch to a
new brand if they were satisfied with the product in the past (Brislin & Kim, 2003; Yau,
1988), or to try new products in general (Legohérel, Daucé, Hsu, & Ranchhold, 2009).
This is considered less conclusive evidence because connection with the past is not the
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only possible explanation for whether people switch brands; other factors, including
variety seeking (e.g., Berlyne, 1970), are alternative explanations.
The past is more integrated with the self for East Asians than for North
Americans. For Asian Americans, higher levels of well-being were associated with, and
resulted from more positive present and past self-ratings. For European Americans,
higher levels of well-being were only associated with, and resulted from more positive
present self-ratings, but not more positive past self-ratings (Kim et al., 2012).
There is evidence that East Asians consider the past to be more important in their
lives compared with North Americans, whereas North Americans consider the present to
be more important in their lives compared with East Asians. Levinson and Peng (2007)
asked the Chinese and Americans to estimate the present value of antique objects, for
example, an antique chair, given their past value. The Chinese placed a higher value on
antique objects. This study presents an exception in which Asian Americans’ responses
resemble Americans rather than the Chinese. In an unpublished study, Gao and Rozin
(2014) recruited Americans and Chinese of comparable age, gender distribution, and
years of education, and asked them to rank, in a positive and a negative hedonic context
respectively, how important anticipation, experience, and memory were in their lives.
The Chinese gave memory a higher ranking than Americans, whereas Americans gave
experience a higher ranking than the Chinese.
East Asians may like to think about the past more, whereas North Americans may
like to think about the present more. Gao and Rozin (2014) asked Chinese and Americans
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which they liked to think about more—the past, present, or future. Most Chinese ranked
the past as the second, whereas most Americans ranked the past as the third, though the
average ranking for the Chinese and Americans was not significantly different. Note that
this does not suggest that the Chinese actually do think about the past more than
Americans. The Chinese and Americans estimated the percentages of past, present, and
future thoughts they had. The Chinese (24.2%) and Americans (26.5%) attributed similar
percentages to the past. Americans reported liking to think about the present more than
the Chinese, but the Chinese (44.8%) and Americans (42.5%) reported similar
percentages of present thoughts.
In sum, East Asians focus more on the past compared with North Americans.
Specifically, East Asians consider the past as more relevant for explaining events (Ji et
al., 2009), directing behaviors (Briley & Aaker, 2007; Stevenson & Stigler, 1992; Q.
Wang & Conway, 2004), and self-evaluation (Kim et al., 2012). Evidence also suggests
that East Asians consider the past or memory as more important and like to think about
the past more compared with North Americans, though the evidence comes mainly from
one unpublished study (Gao & Rozin, 2014). For the hypothesis that North Americans
focus more on the present compared with East Asians, the evidence is less conclusive (Ji
et al., 2009), though not nonexistent (Briley & Aaker, 2007; Gao & Rozin, 2014). Most
evidence comes from studies that had only one representation for the past domain and
supported the hypothesis. One study sampled multiple time points in the past temporal
domain and showed that, moving from the longer term past toward the present,
Canadians’ focus on the temporal domain increased more than that of the Chinese, which
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supported the speculation (Ji et al., 2009). Most evidence comes from a comparison
between Chinese and Americans. Additional research is needed to sample multiple time
points in the past domain and cover more populations from East Asia and North America.
How good is East Asians’ and North Americans’ mental representation of the
past? Briley (2009) has proposed that East Asians’ mental representations of the past and
future tend to be low-level construals that are more concrete and contextual, and North
Americans’ mental representations of the past and future tend to be high-level construals
that are more schematic and decontextualized (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Nussbaum,
Trope, & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2003).
This may relate to the fact that East Asian cultures tend to be interdependent and
North American cultures tend to be independent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Interdependent cultures tend to have a prevention focus that emphasizes security needs,
whereas independent cultures tend to have a promotion focus that emphasizes growth
needs. The prevention focus fosters local, low-level construals because careful processing
of details is needed to fulfill security needs. The promotion focus fosters global, highlevel construals because going beyond the local information is needed in order to achieve
growth (Förster & Higgins, 2005; A. Y. Lee, Keller, & Sternthal, 2010). In addition, in
social contexts, interdependent culture needs to pay close attention to the relationship
between the self and others, which requires people to construct the self and others in a
concrete and specific way rather than abstract and general (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus,
2001; Morris & Peng, 1994).
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Some empirical evidence suggests that East Asians’ memories tend to be more
accurate and complete than North Americans. The theft crime study by Ji et al. (2009)
asked Chinese and European Canadians to freely recall the list of information provided to
them. The Chinese were more accurate in reporting the information about the past than
the Canadians were (Guo et al., 2012). In Ji et al. (2009), the Chinese and European
Canadian students recalled their first day of class at the end of the same day and 2 weeks
later. Canadians reported slightly more information after the first day of class (though the
result did not reach significance); the Chinese reported more information than did
Canadians 2 weeks later. This indicates that Chinese remember the past better than
Canadians do, which supported the hypothesis. This may further suggest that the Chinese
remember the longer term past better than Canadians do, and Canadians remember the
shorter term past better than the Chinese do, which supported the speculation (Ji et al.,
2009).
On the other hand, there is evidence that North Americans tend to report more
details for episodic and autobiographical memories compared with East Asians. European
Americans reported more episodic details when describing past and future events than
East Asians, but both cultures reported a similar amount of nonepisodic details (Wang,
Hou, Tang, & Wiprovnick, 2011). North American adults have an earlier age of first
autobiographical memory and more detailed autobiographical memories of childhood
than East Asian adults do (Leichtman, Wang, & Pillemer, 2003). These may be related to
the fact that European American mothers usually engage in high-elaborative conversation
and scaffold children in reconstructing detailed narratives of the past (Wang et al., 2011),
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and that North American cultures emphasize the role of the self and encourage children to
construct stories about themselves (McAdams, 2008).
In sum, with the exception of episodic and autobiographical memory details, East
Asians seem to have more accurate and complete representations of the past. Further,
there is a trend that East Asians remember the longer term past better than North
Americans, and North Americans remember the shorter term past better than East Asians,
which supported the speculation. Samples included in the comparison consist only of
European Canadians and the Chinese. Further research is needed to cover more
subgroups within East Asian and North American cultures.
How “far away” does the past feel to East Asians and North Americans?
Construal level theory posits that a low-level construal that is concrete and specific is
associated with a proximal temporal distance, whereas a high-level construal that is
abstract and general is associated with a distal temporal distance (Liberman & Trope,
1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003). If East Asians’ mental representations of the past and
future are more concrete and specific than North Americans’, then East Asians may feel
temporally closer to the past and future.
Empirical evidence supports this proposition. A specific time point (e.g., this
month last year) or an event (e.g., one final exam) in the past felt closer to the Chinese
than to the European Canadians (Ji et al., 2009). Past proud or embarrassing events felt
closer to the Japanese than Canadians (Ross, Heine, Wilson, & Sugimori, 2005). I did not
find studies that sampled multiple time points in the past, which could be a direction for
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future research.
Cultural Differences in Future Orientation
Prior research has shown that East Asians have a stronger temporal focus on the
long-term future than North Americans (e.g., Briley, 2009; Brislin & Kim, 2003;
Hofstede, 2001; Ji et al., 2009; Li, 1999; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). As
with the analysis of the past, I present the evidence in three categories.
To what extent do East Asians and North Americans focus on the future?
East Asians in the United States (including Chinese, Korean, and Japanese) imagined the
response to a future event to last longer than European Americans did (S. Lee, Lee, &
Kern, 2011), which suggests that East Asians perceive the consequences to be greater for
given future events and are more connected with future outcomes compared with North
Americans. Japanese and Americans listed as many consequences as they could think of
for converting an area to a national park and wildlife preserve. The responses were coded
into direct consequences that “immediately follow the critical event in time and/or
location,” and indirect consequences that were “relatively far away from the critical even
in time and/or location.” Americans listed more direct consequences than the Japanese,
whereas the Japanese listed more indirect consequences than Americans (Maddux &
Yuki, 2006). This suggests that East Asians may focus on the longer term future
consequences more than North Americans, and North Americans may focus on the
shorter term future consequences more than East Asians, which supports the speculation.
Asian Americans (50% East Asian) and European Americans were asked to indicate,
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with respect to a game of pool, how much a shot would affect the person who takes the
next shot, the third and the sixth shot after the focal shot, respectively, and how much it
would affect the overall outcome. Both cultures indicated that the critical shot had a
bigger effect on the closer shots (shorter term) compared with those that were further
away (longer term). European Americans indicated that the critical shot affected the next
shot (shorter term future) more so than Asian Americans, whereas Asian Americans
indicated that the critical shot affected the sixth shot (longer term future) more so than
European Americans. European Americans’ estimation of future consequences, moving
from shorter term to longer term future, decreased more than that of Asian Americans,
which supports the speculation (Maddux & Yuki, 2006). Hofstede’s (2001) Long-term
Orientation Scale puts future long-term, past, and present temporal orientation on one
single dimension (it uses “long term” to refer to future long-term orientation, and “short
term” to refer to past and present orientation), and does not measure temporal domains
directly (persistence, ordering relationships by status and observing this order, thrift, and
having a sense of shame are positively related to the long-term orientation, and personal
steadiness and stability, protecting “face,” respect for tradition, and reciprocation of
greetings, favors, and gifts are negatively related to long-term orientation), which may
make the results difficult to interpret. However, results from this scale showed that East
Asians countries had high scores on the Long-term Orientation Scale, whereas North
American countries had low scores.
Out of anticipation, experience, and memory, the Chinese and Americans did not
rank the importance of anticipation significantly differently. However, there was a trend
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that the Chinese ranked positive future (anticipation) as more important than Americans,
and Americans ranked negative future (dread) as more important than the Chinese (Gao
& Rozin, 2014). This suggests an interesting possibility that temporal focus may depend
on the valence of the context. Chinese reported liking to think about the future the most
out of past, present, and future (71.43% future), whereas only 43.33% Americans
reported liking to think about the future the most. The two cultures reported similar
percentages of actual future thoughts (31.0%; Gao & Rozin, 2014).
In sum, three studies support the hypothesis that East Asians focus more on future
consequences compared with North Americans (S. Lee et al., 2011; Maddux & Yuki,
2006). Further, two studies sampled multiple time points in the future temporal domain
and supported the speculation (Maddux & Yuki, 2006). There is also evidence that East
Asians consider anticipation as more important and would like to think about the future
more than North Americans. However, this evidence comes from one single unpublished
study, with participants exclusively from China and United States (Gao & Rozin, 2014).
Additional studies are needed to provide more conclusive evidence and cover more
population in the two cultural groups.
How good is East Asians’ and North Americans’ mental representation of the
future? I discussed the proposition that East Asians have a low-level construal of the
future, whereas North Americans have a high-level construal of the future and provided a
theoretical basis for this in the section on past orientation (Briley, 2009). I did not find
empirical evidence for this proposition. However, there is evidence suggesting that East
Asians feel temporally closer to the future compared with North Americans (see next
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section “How ‘far away’ does the future feel to East Asians and North Americans?”),
which is consistent with the view that East Asians have a more concrete and contextual
mental representation of the future compared with North Americans, according to
construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003).
How “far away” does the future feel to East Asians and North Americans?
East Asians in the United States (including Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese) imagined a
given future event taking place sooner than European Americans (S. Lee et al., 2011),
which suggests that East Asians felt temporally closer to the future. In an unpublished
study, Gao and Rozin (2014) asked the Chinese and Americans to indicate the subjective
temporal distance from the present to 3 months and from the present to 20 months into
the future. Americans perceived the shorter term future (i.e., 3 months) as closer
compared with the Chinese, whereas the Chinese perceived the longer term future (i.e.,
20 months) as closer compared with Americans. This suggests that East Asians perceive a
longer term future as closer compared with North Americans, and North Americans
perceive a shorter term future as closer compared with East Asians, which supports the
speculation.
People who feel closer to the future would discount future outcomes less
(Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009). Do East Asians discount future outcomes
less than North Americans? Some empirical evidence suggests that the answer is “yes.”
For example, Asians Americans tend to have higher educational attainments compared
with White Americans (Sue & Okazaki, 2009). Compared with Americans and
Canadians, the Chinese and the Japanese discount the future less in financial planning
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(e.g., save more, retire with more wealth) and health maintenance (e.g., practice safer sex,
smoke less, less obese; M. K. Chen, 2013). However, studies on intertemporal choices
yield mixed results. Some studies suggest that Asians discount delayed outcomes less so
than Westerners. Asian Americans, when primed with their Asian identity, made more
patient choices (Benjamin, Choi, & Strickland, 2010). Bicultural Singaporeans, when
primed with Western (vs. Singaporean) icons, showed less patience (H. Chen, Ng, &
Rao, 2005). Americans discounted the delayed outcomes more steeply than the Japanese
for both monetary gains and losses (Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; Takahashi et al.,
2009). However, other studies suggest that East Asians and North Americans discount
delayed outcomes to similar degrees. Americans and Chinese discounted delayed rewards
to a similar extent (Du et al., 2002). Tan and Johnson (1996) reported no differences in
the temporal discounting rate between Canadian and Chinese undergraduates. A study
that sampled 45 countries found that a comparable proportion of undergraduates of Anglo
and East Asian descent—around 66% to 70%—chose to wait for a delayed reward (M.
Wang, Rieger, & Hens, 2016). Studies on intertemporal choices may yield mixed results
because shorter and longer term future times were not considered separately.
In sum, evidence indicates that East Asians perceive the future as closer compared
with North Americans (S. Lee et al., 2011). It is also suggested that North Americans
perceive a shorter term future as closer and East Asians perceive a longer term future as
closer (Gao & Rozin, 2014), which supports the speculation. Although the studies on
intertemporal choices contain mixed results, studies within real-life contexts, such as
education, finance, health, consistently suggest that East Asians discount future outcomes
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less so than North Americans, which indicates that East Asians feel temporally closer to
the future.
Discussion
Based on the cultural differences on holistic versus analytical cognitive
processing style, and cyclical versus linear prediction trends, this review hypothesizes
that East Asians focus on the past and future more than North Americans, whereas North
Americans focus on the present more than East Asians, and analyzes evidence in three
categories based on the operationalization of temporal orientation. Overall, available
evidence supports the hypothesis. This review also proposes a speculation about how the
cultural difference in temporal orientation changes with respect to the present time point,
which is that when moving from any past or future time point toward the present, North
Americans’ focus on the temporal domain grows more than East Asians’ focus (see
Figure 1). Only studies that sample more than one time point in the past or future
temporal domain can test this speculation. Though very limited in number, the available
evidence consistently supports the speculation.
Connections With Prior Literature
Some articles point out that East Asians may have a stronger past and future
orientation compared with North Americans (e.g., Briley, 2009; Ji et al., 2009; there is a
significant amount of literature suggesting that East Asians have a stronger past
orientation, e.g., Block et al., 1996; Brislin & Kim, 2003; Burkhardt, 1955; Doob, 1971;
Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2009; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Ko & Gentry, 1991;
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Núñez, Cooperrider, Doan, & Wassmann, 2012; Pitta et al., 1999; Rojas-Méndez et al.,
2002; Spadone, 1992; Spears et al., 2000; Yau, 1988; Zuo, 2001). Literature also suggests
that North Americans have a stronger present orientation compared with East Asians
(e.g., Brislin & Kim, 2003; Cho, Kwon, Gentry, Jun, & Kropp, 1999; Ji et al., 2009;
Sundberg, Poole, & Tyler, 1983; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).
Some literature distinguishes short- and long-term past and future, and suggests
that East Asians have a stronger long-term orientation (though they mostly refer to longterm future orientation; e.g., Briley, 2009; Brislin & Kim, 2003; Hofstede, 2001; Li,
1999; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998) and North Americans have a stronger
short-term orientation (e.g., Brislin & Kim, 2003; Hofstede, 2001). Such studies take one
step further and break the past or future into two domains: short term and long term. This
review proposes a hypothesis regarding the cultural differences on three temporal
domains, and further proposes a speculation based on the theoretical views by treating the
past, present, and future as a continuous temporal dimension, and differentiates
predictions based on temporal distance with respect to the present.
Some research argues that East Asians have a past orientation and North
Americans have a future orientation (Brislin & Kim, 2003; Cho et al., 1999; Graham,
1981; Guo et al., 2012; Hall, 1976; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Spears et al., 2000;
Yau, 1988). This may come from the literature on temporal asymmetry, which suggests
that North Americans value the future more than the past, whereas East Asians value the
past more than the future (Guo et al., 2012). These statements hold true when comparing
the past and future temporal orientation within the same culture, but should not be taken
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as a comparison for the same temporal orientation between the two cultures. For
example, although there is evidence that North Americans have a stronger focus on the
future than the past, evidence does not suggest that North Americans have a stronger
focus on the future compared with East Asians.
Cultural Groups
This review compares temporal orientations between East Asians and North
Americans. East Asian samples were Chinese in China, Japanese in Japan, and Korean
nationals, as well as East Asians (Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese) in the United States or
Asian Americans in the United States. North American samples were European
Americans or Americans in the United States, European Canadians or Canadians in
Canada, or Anglo-Americans.
East Asians or Asian Americans in the United States resemble East Asians living
in East Asian countries in their cultural difference with North Americans (except for the
Levinson & Peng, 2007 study, in which Caucasian and Asian Americans from United
States did not show a significant difference). This suggests that cultural heritage has a
stronger influence on the tendency for temporal orientation than the country of residence.
In addition, even though both Asian Americans and Caucasians are likely to have English
as their native language, there are cultural differences between these two groups (e.g.,
Kim et al., 2012). When East Asians or Asian Americans in the United States used
English to complete the studies, the cultural difference remains (e.g., Kim et al., 2012; S.
Lee et al., 2011). These suggest that language is unlikely to explain the cultural
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difference (this contradicts the view in M. K. Chen, 2013).
It is possible that the cultural differences between East Asians and North
Americans, with most evidence coming from China, United States and Canada, is
because of the fact that China has a much longer history. Are the differences in temporal
orientation a cultural difference or a difference because of the length of history? Greece,
a Western culture with a much longer history, resembles the patterns found in North
America rather than China. Though I do not have direct empirical evidence on Greek
participants’ temporal orientation, Greeks tend to predict linear changes (Fisher, 1964),
which, theoretically, is consistent with a present orientation. In addition, M. K. Chen
(2013) suggests that Greece saves less than East Asian countries, which resembles the
tendency of North Americans.
The majority of evidence for East Asia, especially for past orientation, comes
from the Chinese, which raises the question of whether the conclusions apply to East
Asians in general. Though limited in numbers, the studies that sampled other East Asian
cultures, including the Japanese (Ross et al., 2005) and East Asian Americans (Briley &
Aaker, 2007; Kim et al., 2012) for past orientation, and Korean and the Japanese (S. Lee
et al., 2011; Maddux & Yuki, 2006) for future orientation, consistently show similar
findings as the Chinese.
The observed temporal orientation of North Americans may be generalizable to
Westerners. First, research has shown similar psychological tendencies among cultures
with a Confucian influence, which include China, Japan, Korea, and so forth, compared
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with cultures with an Aristotelian/Judeo-Christian heritage, which include the United
States, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett,
1998; Maddux & Yuki, 2006; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett et al., 2001). Second,
the theoretical basis for the proposed cultural differences between East Asians and North
Americans on temporal orientation, including an analytical cognitive processing style
(Nisbett, 1998; Nisbet et al., 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999) and a linear way of predicting
change (Ji, 2005; Ji et al., 2001), apply to Westerners in general. Third, empirical studies
show that Westerners in general resemble North Americans in temporal orientation.
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) found that Confucian cultures tended to score
higher on longer term planning and Western cultures tended to score higher on shorter
term planning. Anglo-Australians resemble European Americans in that they discount
long-term rewards more than the Chinese. For example, Chinese students tended to
believe that effort would contribute to their academic success (Stevenson & Stigler,
1992) and would put more effort into their academic work compared with AngloAustralian and Euro-American students did (Rosenthal & Feldman, 1991).
Within-Cultural Differences
For most significant East–West differences, more of the variation is within as
opposed to between cultures (Rozin, 2003). Talhelm et al. (2014) showed that even
within China, there are regional differences between north and south. Specifically,
northern Chinese are more independent and analytical in thinking than southern Chinese.
This suggests that northern Chinese may resemble North Americans in temporal
orientation.
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It has been suggested that wealth and education lead to patience (Becker &
Mulligan, 1997; M. Wang et al., 2016; however, research on the relationship between
wealth and discount rates in intertemporal choices yields mixed results, see Anderson,
Dietz, Gordon, & Klawitter, 2004; Harrison, Lau, & Williams, 2002; Hausman, 1979;
Kirby et al., 2002; Lawrance, 1991; Mink, 1993; M. Wang et al., 2016). The
modernization hypothesis suggests that people become more individualistic and engage
in more analytic thinking as they become wealthier (Greenfield, 2009; Talhelm et al.,
2014). This suggests that the wealthier regions within East Asia or North America may
show temporal orientation more characteristic of North Americans compared with
regions that are less wealthy.
Nowadays young people from Eastern cultures have more access to Western
culture as a result of globalization and may show features that traditionally represent
Western cultures. For example, in China and Japan, the power of collectivism declined
among young people (Naito & Gielen, 2005; Stevenson & Zusho, 2002). Even within
North America, younger Americans appear to be more individualistic than older
Americans (Heine, 2012). Thus, compared with older adults, young people’s temporal
orientation in both cultures may be more similar to North Americans, whereas the elderly
may be more characteristic of East Asians. Socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen,
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) provides a competing prediction. The theory argues that as
people perceive their future to be more limited, which is often associated with aging,
people have a shorter term orientation in emotional regulation and prioritize emotional
goals that bring shorter term satisfaction. The theory suggests that as people age, they
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may resemble North American in temporal orientation, at least in the domain of
emotional regulation. The results on how aging relates to discount rate in intertemporal
choice are mixed. Some studies show that, as age increases, people discount delayed
rewards less steeply (Du et al., 2002; Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994). Others show that
middle-aged people discount less than both younger and older people (Read & Read,
2004). It is possible that the relationship between age and temporal orientation depends
on other factors.
Limitations
This review does not discuss cultural differences surrounding other topics related
to time, such as polychronicity (i.e., preference for doing multiple things at a time) and
monochronicity (i.e., preference for doing one thing at a time), event time (i.e., go with
natural flow of events) and clock time (i.e., adhere to schedules), pace of life (i.e., speed
of doing everyday activities), time use (i.e., how much time people spend on various
activities), and so forth, because these topics will warrant separate reviews (see Fulmer,
Crosby, & Gelfand, 2014, for a review).
On the topic of temporal orientation, this review focuses on comparing the two
cultural groups in terms of the same temporal domain, and does not compare the temporal
orientation for the past, present, and future within the same culture. First, the temporal
orientation for the past and future may not be symmetrical for the same culture. The
literature of temporal asymmetry shows that East Asians focus more on the past than the
future (Guo et al., 2012), whereas North Americans focus more on the future than the
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past (Graham, 1981; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Spears et al., 2000; Specter &
Ferrari, 2000). Second, both cultures may focus more on the present than the past or
future (e.g., Briley & Aaker, 2007; Ji et al., 2009, Study 1; Maddux & Yuki, 2006, Study
1), but this may not be the case for all studies (e.g., Ji et al., 2009, Study 2). Figure 1
should be used with these considerations in mind.
Future Directions
This review brings out new directions to study temporal orientation. One
possibility is to examine temporal focus in the context of positive, neutral, and negative
valenced events. Most research on temporal orientation so far has downplayed the factor
of valence. Gao and Rozin (2014) have results indicating that positive and negative
contexts seem to prompt different importance rankings for the future. It may be
interesting to study psychological temporal domains. The time points that people
naturally think of may reflect the psychological past, present, and future rather than the
physically defined domains. Technically, any time point in the past, even one second ago,
is the past, but people may not perceive it to be the past. Psychologically, people may
naturally group time points together, which forms three temporal domains. The two
dividing points, which delineate the boundary of when the two cultures differ in temporal
orientation, may represent, psychologically, how people divide time.
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Footnotes
1 For the purpose of this review, I use “North American” to describe American and
Canadian cultures. Mexican cultures may warrant separate consideration.
2 Sircova et al. (2015) administered the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory with five
temporal orientations—past positive, past negative, present hedonistic, present fatalistic,
and future—to 24 countries, which included China, Japan, and the United States.
However, the psychometrics for East Asian samples were not sufficiently sound for the
purpose of making cross-cultural comparisons.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research examined the factors that affected prospection, in the
domains of future time perception, sequence preference for future experience and future
temporal orientation.
Valence affected prospection across the three domains. In Chapter 1, valence
affected future time perception. A positive future experience felt further away compared
to a negative future experience. The duration of a negative future experience felt longer
compared to the duration of a positive future experience. In Chapter 2, there was a
stronger preference in both American and Asian Indian cultures for an ascending
sequence for negative future experiences compared to for positive future experiences. In
Chapters 2 and 3, the importance ranking of anticipation, experience and memory was
different by valence. In chapter 2, both Indians and Americans rated anticipation as more
important for negative events. In chapter 3, there was a trend that the Chinese ranked
positive future (anticipation) as more important than Americans, and Americans ranked
negative future (dread) as more important than the Chinese (Gao & Rozin, 2014). These
findings suggest that valence may be a factor that affects prospection across domains and
framings of events.
The mechanism through which valence affects prospection may differ depending
on the specific aspect of prospection (e.g., future time perception, sequence preference
for future experience, future temporal orientation) or it may be consistent across the
various aspects of prospection. One major difference between the positive and the
negative is that the negative is more intense than the positive (Baumeister, Bratslavsky,
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Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Of course, with this in mind, it is
possible to equate the intensity of any pair of negative and positive events. Does
intensity explain the valence effect in the present research?
Bilgin and LeBoeuf (2010) have noted that both the valence effect and the
intensity effect may be at work to contribute to the difference in time perception between
positive and negative events (Chapter 1). Chapter 1 only tested the valence effect and
didn’t test the effect of intensity, but the results suggest that, the valence effect is stronger
than the intensity effect. Job scenario’s positive version (M = 31.80) was rated as more
intense than the negative version (M = -16.96), and the lawsuit scenario’s negative
version (M = -34.89) was rated as more intense than the positive version (M = 10.90).
However, both the job and the lawsuit scenarios showed the same effect, that the positive
future experiences felt further away than the negative ones, and that the negative future
experiences felt longer in duration than the positive ones. This suggests that the
difference between the positive and negative in Experiment 1 was due to a valence effect,
rather than an intensity effect. However, this issue can only be settled clearly by future
research.
The intensity account of the valence effect may be consistent with the stronger
preference for an ascending sequence in negative situations compared to positive
situations in Chapter 2, with the assumption that people have a stronger preference for an
ascending sequence for more intense situations. Future research may explore and
examine the explanations of why valence affects prospection. For example, does the
negative context prompt different responses from the positive context because people pay
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more attention to the negative context? Is it possible that people process the positive and
negative situations in different ways because they serve different purposes? People may
be more likely to choose positive experiences because of their hedonic value, but they are
less likely to choose negative experiences for this reason. They are more likely to choose
negative experiences for a practical purpose and endure the negative sensation associated
with the experience (compared to positive experiences). The difference in the motivation
to choose positive versus negative experiences may prompt people to place different
values on the different components of positive or negative experiences. For example,
people may value the ending of a negative experience, which signifies the outcome of an
experience, more than the ending of a positive experience. This may lead to different
responses in negative contexts of prospection than positive ones.
Culture has been shown to affect prospection. Chapter 2 has shown a significant
cultural difference between the Americans and Asian Indians in sequence preference.
Americans showed a stronger preference for an ascending sequence compared to Indians,
whereas Indians showed a stronger preference for a descending sequence compared to
Americans. Chapter 3 noted the cultural difference between East Asians and North
Americans in their temporal orientation. East Asians showed a stronger focus on the
longer term horizons compared to North Americans, whereas North Americans showed a
stronger focus on the shorter term horizons compared to East Asians. Chapter 1 did not
explicitly test the effect of choice on future time perception with different cultural groups.
The prior literature has noted cultural differences in the perception of choices. For
example, Americans were more likely than Indians to construe actions as choices
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(Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010). Such cultural differences in the
perception of choices are likely to lead to cultural differences in future time perception.
The cultural differences on prospection may reflect each cultural group’s
adaptation to their own environment. For example, the finding that East Asians show a
stronger focus on the longer term compared to North Americans in Chapter 3 may be
related to East Asians’ history and practice of growing rice. Talhelm et al. (2014) have
shown that the rice growing may have caused people in South China to show more
collectivism compared to people in the North China who plant wheat, because growing
rice requires more large-scale collaboration than growing wheat. This shows that the
specific requirement for growing rice or wheat may have caused cultural differences.
Another feature of growing rice plantation is that it requires planting a few times per
year. Because of the multiple planting cycles, people have to plant and harvest very
promptly according to a schedule. People who plant rice may have to plan ahead far more
into the future and show a longer term future orientation. The domestication of rice
occurred in East Asia and even today China produces the largest quantity of rice in the
world. It is notable that Southern China, Korea and Japan, the major sources of East
Asian data, have rice as their major staple grain. This may relate to East Asians’ longer
term future orientation compared to North Americans.
Future research may 1) more precisely describe the cultural differences in
prospection, across different situations and framings, with different methods of eliciting
preferences or choice (See Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008); and 2) examine the
mechanisms of such cultural differences. Why different cultures show a difference in
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prospection? How do such cultural differences in prospection illuminate each culture’s
story of adaptation to their own environment?
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